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meet, telephone one another, draft replies and curse everybody’. 571 The British

Cabinet held a meeting on 15 March to discuss the crisis in Bahrain. In the meeting

Nutting examined the possible responses to the conflict. One was to back the NUC

and take the risk that the strike would continue for a longer period. Another was to

bring in one hundred and seventeen Iraqi officers to assist Bahrain’s police

(favoured by the Ruler but currently discouraged by his Adviser). Deploying British

troops was also mooted. Eden noted in the meeting Iraqi personnel were already en

route and that it would look ‘indecisive to divert them now’. Nutting suggested

advising the Iraqis to delay their arrival and to significantly decrease their numbers.

Eden ordered to inform Burrows that he could deploy British troops to restore

order. 572

In the Cabinet meeting’s conclusion it was disclosed that British troops had

already been deployed to Bahrain from the Trucial State of Sharjah (in modern day

United Arab Emirates). Additionally there were two frigates anchored off Bahrain

and a cruiser was ordered to sail from Malta. Eden also disclosed that the

Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East and the Gulf Resident both recommended

that any use of force by Britain in Bahrain might result in very damaging long-term

consequences. However with current developments ‘in Bahrain some use of British

troops seemed inevitable’, the Prime Minister commented. He noted Burrows’ view

that the situation would be exacerbated by the arrival of Iraqi reinforcements,

recommending that no more than thirty ‘non-commissioned officers’ be sent to

Bahrain and that those ‘should be held back until the situation had been restored’.

571 Descent to Suez, 15 March 1956, 347.
572 TNA, CAB 195/14, C.M. 23 (56), Bahrain, 15 March 1956.

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