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received Soviet support by aiding the Egyptians in organising its intelligence
services. The plan also featured the despatch of trained Egyptian personnel (in the
form of education missions) to the Arab World who would establish communication
‘with anti-Government movements’. 575
Regardless of the accuracy of these claims, Eden, at the time leading up to the
Suez crisis, had seemed obsessed by Nasser. Nutting recalled in his memoir that
during a telephone conversation between him and Eden, he suggested earlier
various steps that should be taken to isolate Nasser. Eden viewed Nutting’s
recommendations unfavourably and exclaimed:
But what’s all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralising’
him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, can’t you understand? I
want him removed, and if you and the Foreign Office don’t agree, then
you’d better come to the Cabinet and explain why. 576
The Political Agent had another meeting on 15 March with four members of
the HEC. An initial agreement was reached for the official recognition of the Party
provided that Al-Bakir left Bahrain for a fixed time as requested by the Ruler and
that an enquiry into recent events was held. No objection to the Ruler’s conditions
by the HEC was recorded. At that point there seemed to be a clear division between
the members of the HEC. Al-Bakir and Al-Shamlan wished to bring the strike to a
swift end but the Shi’ite element of the Party saw themselves to be in a personal
feud (particularly with the police) following recent events. Furthermore locals from
575 Eden to Eisenhower, 15 March 1956 in The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957, edited
by P.G. Boyle, (Chapel Hill, NC: 2005), 123-24.
576 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, 34-35.
© Hamad E. Abdulla 187