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future. Eden, it seems, preferred for negotiations to stall rather than to secretly plot
Belgrave’s demise. 581
On 16 March the FO’s Eastern Department instructed the Resident that any
move to displace Belgrave at this point ‘would be a great blow to British prestige in
Bahrain and in the whole of the Gulf’. It also proposed three moves: the hiring of an
Assistant Adviser to replace Belgrave, the hiring of an Iraqi or Pakistani Adviser to
replace the Adviser, and dividing the position of the Adviser into two different
posts. 582 Burrows then informed the Ruler Britain’s support of the Administration
and its ‘retention of Belgrave’. 583
With this directive in mind the Resident urged the FO to consider hiring an
assistant to the Adviser who would gradually take over the Adviser’s work, saying
that this would improve public opinion and maintain British prestige. Belgrave’s
status had not been a matter for debate in recent negotiations, but the nationalists
spread rumours that Belgrave was soon to leave his post. The Residency, in return,
warned the Party about repeating such claims and threatened that -- if it continued -
- they would have to issue a public statement on the matter. 584 A possible
explanation as to why the Party spread rumours of Belgrave’s departure was to
appease their supporters and convince strikers to suspend the strike. 585
The Government of Bahrain issued an official communication, signed by
Belgrave, on 16 March recognising the opposition under the new name of the
581 TNA, FO 371/120549, M.45/56, Prime Minister’s Personal Minute, 17 March 1956.
582 TNA, FO 371/120544, D.M.H. Riches from FO to Residency, 16 March 1956.
583 TNA, FO 371/120544, Burrows to FO, 17 March 1956.
584 TNA, FO 1016/465, Despatch 231, Burrows to FO, 16 March 1956.
585 TNA, FO 1016/465, Despatch 81, Burrows to FO, 17 March 1956.
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