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           and Molisin Pasha. This took place at tho Nakib’a residence near Zobair on
                                         tho 17th November 1000, and during the
                     No. 62 of Pros, citod.
                                         course of it, Molisin was able to persuade
           tho Sheikh to roturn to Basrah with him tho same night. Next day they were
           for several hours at tho Telegraph OlOco, coramuuicating with Constantinople,
           and early on tho 19th Mubarak started again for Koweit.
               125.  It should be added that, at their interview outsido the town, tho Vali
           presented Mubarak with tho insignia of tho Mojidi, 2nd Class, which the Sultan
           recently conferred on him as a reward for tho tact and loyalty ho displayed in
           tho reception at Koweit of British and Russian mon-of*war. It was also
           reported that according to tho latest advices, tho Arab levies on both sides
           had been gradually dispersing. Tho bulk of his forces wore behind, undor tho
           command of his son, and some anxioty was felt at first lest they should make
           a treacherous attack on Abdul Aziz’s men, as they journeyed homewards.
               126.  The only person who had distinctly scored throughout these
           events was the Vali, Molisin Pasha, who had triumphantly asserted tho
           Sultan’s authority ovor the two chief men in Arabia, and had avortod an ugly
           crisis by a few promises, which it would cost nothing to break. Ho had induced
           Mubarak to pay his promised visit to Basrah, an ovent which His Excellency
           informed Mr. Wratislaw, in a momont of expansion, he never hoped to bring
           off.
               127.  ” Abdul Aziz’s prestige ” Mr. Wratislaw thought, “ cannot but suffer
           from his failure to exact vengeance from Mubarak and Sadun. Indeed, if he
           sits down tamely and pockets tho affront, ho can hardly hope to maintain his
           position as Paramount Sheikh in Arabia. But this ho is hardly likely to do,
           and a rcnowul of hostilities may bo expected later on.”
              128. Mubarak had put himself to much expense and troublo in organising
           and equipping a large army, and yet, at tho bidding of the Vali, he had returned
           to Koweit without striking a blow. By this visit here he had once allowed
           tho Turks to assert their suzerainty over Koweit, which, indeed, in his corres­
           pondence with the Valis and the Sultan since his accession to the Sheikhsbip
           he had constantly admitted. Molisin Pasha, informed Mr. Wratislaw’s drago­
           man that, while in Basrah, Mubarak had assured tho Sultan that ho was His
           Imperial Majesty’s most faithful servant, and that it was solely in obedience
           to his orders that he had withdrawn his force without attacking tho Amir. Ho
           had further undertaken to cease coquetting with “ Poreign Powers.”
              129. One of tho conditions on which the Amir of Nojd was induced by the
                                         Vali of Basrah to withdraw was that Sadun
            No. 75 of Secret E.» February 1901, Noi. 22.107.
                                         Pasha should bo hunted down and satis­
           faction should be obtained from both Sadun and Mubarak for the raids made
           into his territory. It was reported that lato in November Major General
           Mahomed Pasha, Daghestanli, was sout to conduct operations against Sadun,
           and actually captured him. But Sadun soon after escaped or perhaps was
           allowed to escape.
              130.  The instructions of the Secretary of State that Colonel Kemball should
                                        visit Koweit were duly communicated to him
                No*. 50. 61, 53. 55. 66, 67. 61.
                                        by telegram, but on 19th November he telo-
           graphed that the Koweit crisis was over and both sides were on their way home.
           He therefore presumed that his visit was not necessary, and asked for instruc­
           tions. The Secretary of State however still wished that Colonel Kemball should
           proceed to Koweit, as arranged, since tho Sheikh bad been absent on his
           previous visit and he could learn the result of the Sheikh’s visit to Basrah,
           Colonel KombalL howevor doprocatcd a visit at this time sinco Mr. Wratis-
           law was thoroughly postod as to the facts connected with the Sheikh’s visit to
           Basrah. He also added
              11 Although crisis is paasod for prosont, thcro is no doubt that Amir of Nojd has consider­
           able griovancc against Mubarak, and I fear my visit in ship-of-war to Koweit will unduly
           encourage Sheikh to think ho oan do what ho likes and. that ho will reoeivo our protection.
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