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Visit two months hcnco wou’d not bo opon to objection, but at present, for nbovo ronsons as
well as recent interest shown by Turkoy in Koweit, think that visit unadvieablo, and mi"kt
also embarrass Sheikh.” °
131. This view—concurred in by His Excellency the Viceroy—was tele­
graphed to the Secretary of State, and was acccptod by Ilor Majesty’s Govern­
ment.

XVII-—Renewal of hostilities between the Sheikh of Koweit and
the Amir of Nejd, December 1900—May 1901.

132. Reporting an Koweit affairs on 3rd December 1900, Colonel Kemball
No. of Secret e., February looi, No*. 22— anticipated that both Ibn Rashid and
107, Sheikh Mubarak would not sit quiet, but
resume hostilities at an early date. It was doubtful whether lbn Rashid would
tamely submit to tbo affronts and injuries lie had been recontly subjected to.
On the other band Sheikh Mubarak knew that the Amir had espoused the cause
of his enemy Yusuf and his nephews, and there was little doubt that he would
continuo to side with Abdul Rahman bin Eeysal and Sheikh Sadun and
assist them in their attacks on the Amir of Nejd.
Colonel Kemball also observed :—
“ Oar position is, it seems to me, a very difficult one. We are not called on to interfere
between Sheikh Mubarak and the Amir of Nojd ; indeed, it would appear that, considering our
relations with Sheikh Mubarak, it would be to our interest to see bis authority placed on a
firmer basis. On the other hand, we desire that the Chief of Koweit should avoid any display
of activity, which would give Turkey an excuse for a greater degree of interference in the affairs
of Koweit. We clearly cannot give Mubarak any assistance to enable him to prosecute bis
warlike operations, and I think that all wo can do is to convey to Lima warning that, although
our agreement with him gives us an interest in seeing the integrity of Koweit maintained, we
cannot interfere to protect him against the Amir of Nejd who, it appears, has undoubtedly
received considerable provocation at his hands. We further counsel him to keep quiet, and not
give the Turks cause for interfering more actively in the affairs of his country. I do not be­
lieve that he would, in his present state of confidence, accept this advice, but I can suggest no
other course of action. In my opinion, for the present at any rate, my visit to Koweit would
not be advisable ”,
133. On tho 10th December Colonel Kemball wrote to Sheikh Mubarak
advising him not to take steps which would
Enclosure 2 to No. 103 of Pro. cited.
causo others to exercise a more active
interference in the affairs of his country. He added.—“It seems to me that you
are pursuing a dangerous policy by continuing to provoke the Amir of Nejd
and I again counsel you to keep quiet.” The Sheikh was also given to. under­
stand that it was not probable that the British Government would give him
assistance in the shape of guns to enable him to proscutc his warlike schemes
against Ibn Rashid.
134. The news-agent at Koweit was also instructed to convey a message
to tho Sheikh from the Political Resident
No. 68 in Secret E, March 1901, No*. 67-68.
to tho effect that he should keep quiet.
But the Sheikh stated in reply that so longjas Yusuf-hin-Ibrahim remained with
Ibn Rashid in Nejd he would not keep quiet hut instigate Ihn Rashid to
attack Koweit. The Sheikh therefore thought that it would not he prudent to
stay in Koweit and that he should proceed for the protection of his tribes.
135. Meanwhile alarming news of the impending hostilities had reached
London, and the Secretary of State, on the
•6c* appendix F.
suggestion* of the Eoreign Office, lele-
graphed to the Viceroy on 20th Ecbruary :—
“ It is desirable to avoid renewal of hostilities between Sheikh Koweit and Amir of Nejd.
No cs of Sccrot E March lorn No. r7 ns Kemball should now visit Koweit, ascertain thero
No. C„ of Secret E., March 1901, No*. 67-08. rcsource6 0f Sheikh, position of affairs, counsol
avoidance of war. If lie finds Sheikh is intractable, ho can point out Agreement of 1899 giving
British Government right to expect th*t their advice will he followed, and ho can inlorm
Sheikh that ho must report position for tho orders of Government. It is ndvisabloto arrango
with Naval Comraander-iu-Chief to have ships ready to proceed to Koweit pending final sc lo-
ment of affairs,”