Page 114 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

38
No. 227.
-49. Tho Political Resident was instructed accordingly. TIo visited Koweit,
Mohamraerali and Basrah and sent the following long mossago on 8th August,
which showed that affairs at Koweit wero again taking a bad turn.
“ So far as Amir oF Ncjd and Sheikh Mubarak are concerned, position docs not scorn to
have altered. Amir of Ncjd is believed to be still at his capital, but therein no communication
betweon Koweit and Nojd, and nothing definito is known regarding him. Mubarak told me
that he has no intention of making hostile movement against Amir of Ncjd who, he thinks, is
not likely to make any move against Koweit for some time. In any ease, it is certain he will
not attempt to attack Koweit unless he is ordered by Turkey and is assured of their support. I
could get no news in Koweit as to what is being done between Turkey and Amir of Nejd.
Mubarak is dependent on Basrah f-»r his news, and he told me that ho had heard that his
friend, the Yali, had been dismissed. Ho understood that tho counsels of his enemies at
Constantinople had prevailed, and that the Turks were prepared to concentrate troops in the
Montefik, on which he expressed his readiness to come to terms with Amir of Nojd, and pro­
posed certain conditions which appeared reasonable. He cannot opon negotiations himself, but
he suggested Sheikh of Moliaramerah who is a friend ot both parties as intermediary. From
Koweit I proceeded to Mohammerah whero I saw Sheikh, and asked him if do would act : he
said he could not give me answer immediately, but he promised to consider matter and to let
me have a reply as soon as possible ; ho said he would have great difficulty in finding reliablo
messengers to send to Amir of Nojd ; moreover, road was unsafe, and he feared to do anything
which might excite displeasure of the Turks who would object to the settlement between the
Amir of Nejd and Mubarak. Failing Sheikh Kbazal, the only way I can think to communicate
with Amir of Ncjd is through his Basrah Agent. I then proceeded to Basrah, where I saw
Wratblaw, who told mo that he had received reliable news that the Turks arc preparing to con-
ccntrate formidable force on the Euphrates, and that tho well known EdhcmPeslia is on his vray
to Baghdad to assume command. He believes that this can only be intended against Koweit,
and that great efForts will be made with in next two or three months to settle Koweit question
by force, if necessary. I fear that if Wratisluw’s news is correct, Amir of Nejd will refuse
to entertain proposal for settlement with Mubarak, being assured of the Turkish support, and
even if the arrangement is made, I do not think that the Turks will be deterred from pioceeding
against Koweit. As to maintaining our hold over Mubarak, we can only do this if we assure
ham of our support against the Turks. He asked me what he was to do if the Turks land men
at Koweit, as he could not commit himself to tho extent of using force against the Turks unless
he is assured of our support, and he is most anxious to know how far he can count on this.
Thero is no doubt that the chief factor of importance in the Koweit question i9 the action of
Turkey. Settlement between the Amir of Nejd and Mubarak is of secondary importance,
and the question of maintaining bold upon Koweit depends entirely on tho degree of support,
we can give Mubarak against Turkey. At present ho is entirely in our hands and enxiou9 to
remain so, but if ho finds that we cannot support him, ho will have to mako the best terms be
oan with them. " Sphinx” is the only ship of war now in tho Gulf. She took mo to Koweit,
and returns me to Bushire to coal. Under existing circumstances it seems useless for her to
return to Koweit unless instructions are sent as to the action to bo taken in the event of Turkoy
landing men. It might be as well that sho should proceed to Basrah where Turkish gun.boat
is and whore she would receive earliest information of tho intention of Turks to send troops to
Koweit by sea. Fact of " Sphinx ” being at Basrah might prevent any such (move-ment ?
and give time for negotiations.”
150. On the 9th Colonel Kemball again telegraphed :—
No. 223 “ Immediate danger I now fear is that Turkish troops may be landed at Koweit from
Turkish gun-boat. At present instructions given to Navy do not allow of any active support
being given to Sheikh to prevent this, audit is advisable that early instructions should be sent
to provide for this contingency. If Turkish troops are onco lauded, matters will assurao very
serious aspect.”
151. The Government of India received confirmatory evidence of the inten­
tions of the Porto from a copy of a telegram addressed by tho Sultan to the Vali
of Basrah, which was secured on 26th July by tho Captain of tho Sphinx and
which ran as follows:—
11 Accordingly to the agreement of the Powers, if there is at any place a Turkish Flag or
officers of the Government, it is not in the right of any of the Powers to interforo. Therefore,
you are to endeavour to persuade Sheikh Mubarak to roccive a party of soldiers with their
Captain, and, if it is ncccsssary for promotion or presents to bo made, let us know what
Mubarak Pasha wants in a report, and it will be dono according to Government custom.
No. 229.
151A. A purport of tho Political Resident’s telegrams, datod 8th and 9th
August and of the Sultan’s message'was telegraphed by His Excellency the
Viceroy to the Secretary of State on 10th August with the following addition
“ Sphinx is at present the only ship of war in Gulf. But I am warning Admiral that
others may be required at short notice. Please telegraph instructions as to notion to bo taken if
Turks move against Koweit, and whether any assurance of support may bo givon to Mubarak.
It should fccm that naval demonstration in Gulf and plain words at Constantinople art 60le
means of avoi ling serious complications, if rumours as to Turkish intentions aro oorreot.