Page 173 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

97
APPENDIX P.

(See paragraph 135.)

Proposal made by Sir N- O’Conor to advise Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit
to keep quiet. February 1901.

In December 1900, there were reports of preparation for war between the :
two parties, ancl Sir N. C’Conor addressed
No. 121 of Secret E., June 1001, Nos. 118-230.
the following important despatch, dated
10th February 1901, to the Marquess of Lausdowne, discussing the situation :—
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt by yesterday’s messenger of Your Lordship’s
despatch No. 29 of the 5th February enclosing a memorandum on the affairs of Koweit
ending with Mr. Wratislaw’s despatch No. *11 of tho 22nd November.
Your Lordship has sinco received Mr. Wratislaw’s confidential despatch No. 47 of tho
14th December reporting a conversation with the Vali of 13a6rah, in which he warned His
Excellency of our interest in Koweit, and also a further dospitch, marked No. 50 Confidential
of the 28(li December, statinir that tho Sheikh of Koweit and his partisans arc making fresh
preparations for a campaign against the Amir of Nejd. Mr. Wralislnw supplements this
last despatch by a private letter, in which lie states that “ both Mub irak and Abdul Aziz are
preparing for war as fast as they can, and that, though it would be contrary to precedent, if a
pitched battle takes placo, the two Chiefs are very much incensed against one another, and aro
doing their best to bring their men up to the scratch.
The Amir of Nejd is, as Your Lordship is aware, a Chief of considerable influence, whoso
authority extends over a wide circuit of Central Arabia. lie is generally considered as well
disposed towards England, and it is desirable to avoid, if possible, anything which would
alienate his sympathies; but ns far as I know there have been no politic d or personal relations
between him and any British official of recent date, though 1 believe Colonel Lcch contem­
plated, had lie remained at Baghdad, paying him a visit.
The Sheikh of Koweit appears to be a ruler of considerable determination of character, wily
and self-seeking. lie is probably emboldened by his convention with the British Govern­
ment to go farther than he otherwise would do, and possibly counts upon Ilis Majesty’s
Government saving him from couscquenccs of an unsuccessful attick upou his powerful
neighbour, Abdul Aziz, of Nejd.
An outbreak of hostilities between the two Chiefs can hardly fail to bring the Turks
into the field, and to offer the Ottoman Government and tho astute Vali of Basrah. Mohsin
Pasha a further opportunity of affirming the Sultan’s suzerainty, which tho Sheikh seems of
his own accord t«» have admitted last November, while at tho same time he promised to cease
coquetting with Foreign Powers.
His Majesty’s Government may thus be placed in a difficult position and be forced
cither to raise an unpleasant question with the Ottoman Government., or to assert effectivo
control over Koweit, or else sacrifice tho privileged position acquired by the Convention
of January 18*-»9. It is hardly to be expected that the Sheikh of Koweit will respect an
Agreemeut from which he derives no security aud little material advantage.
Being aware how Ronsitivo the Sultan is in regard to British Policy in the Persian Gulf,
and how much his feelings in this respect are worked on by another I’ower, 1 should regret
being oblig«d, without very strong reason, to do anything that would encourage His Majesty’s
anxiety in this respect and more particularly at the present moment, when ii is our duty to
try and stave olf any complications which might pubsiOly lead cither to intervention or to the
loss of prestige and influence.
It is well, therefore, to considor whether any personal influence can be exerted on the
Sheikh of Koweit, and whether any steps can lie taken to dissuade him from joining Abdur-
rahman-bin-Fcysul and Sadoun in an attack upon the Amir of Nejd, or otherwise provoking
disturbances which may load to serious trouble in those parts.
I have consulted Mr. Wratislaw as to what action, under present circumstances, he
thinks ought tobe taken with a view to exercising a pacific influence upon tho rival parties. IIo
believes Mubarak will disregard more advice; but lie fays that the Amir of i'ejd has an
Agent at Bast ah through whom he could intimate to 11 is Highness in a fiiondly and confiden­
tial manner that we inii-nd to rcslraiu the Sheikh of Koweit, and request him equally to
abstain from aggression.