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                                     APPENDIX G.

                              (See Section X I’ll I paragraphs 144-146.)

            (1)  Correspondence in Europe regarding the proposed assumption of
                                 protectorate over Koweit.

            (2)  Misunderstanding between the Government of India and Her
                Majesty’s Government as regards the former’s attitude in the
                matter. May—June 1901.

                In May 1901 overtures were made by Ibn Rashid to Mr. TVratislaw with a
                                          view to his being  taken under British
             Sorrel E., October 1501, Nos. 184-315.
                                          protection. Sir N. O’Conor reported th
            fact to the Foreign Office  in his despatch No.  Cl, dated 29th May 1901. On
            being consulted by the Foreign Office, Lord George Hamilton consulted Lord
            Curzon, and on receipt of His Excellency’s telegram, dated 8th June (paragraph
            145) gave expression to the following views in the India Office letter No. 249,
            dated 14th June 1901 :—
               “ I am to enclose a copy of a telegram, dated the 8th June, giving the views of the
            Governor*General of India on the situation. At the outset I am to observe that L«»r<l
            Curzon’8 statement relative  to the declaration of an open protectorate “ to which sanction of
            Foreign Office was reported  in your telegram of 24th  December 1898. but withdrawn in your
            telegram of 0th January 1899/'* is not thoroughly accurate : and since it is important that the
            facts of the case should be remembered, 1 am to recapitulate them. In your letter of the 5th
            December 1898, you stated that, in Lord Salisbury’s opinions the question, of establishing a
            protectorate over Koweit and its consequent rcsponsiblitics was a matter primarily for the
            consideration of the Government of India. If that Government were of opinion that the
            protectorate could be undertaken without difficulty or inconvenient extension of the duties of
            tlie police already exercised by it in the Persian Gulf, Lord Salisbury would approve of such
            a step, and His Lordship would diplomatically support .such a protectorate. Accordingly, on
            24th December, the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, was informed that the Foreign Office would approve
            of a protectorate on the understanding and the conditions set forth, and Ilia Excellenoy was
            asked to 6tatc what measures ho could take to make the protectorate effective, on the supposition
            that he could rely on Her Majesty’s Government for diplomatic support. The Viceroy did not
            accept the conditions or reply to the enquiry. Meanwhile a fresh proposal was put before
            the Viceroy on the Gth January based upon your letter, dated the 4th January. As a precau­
            tionary measure, it was proposed to lake immodiate steps for obtaining from the Sheikh an
            arrangement not to lake cede, lease, mortgage, or otherwise alienate or give for occupation any
            portion of his territory to the Government or the subjects of another Power without the
            consent of tho British Government. This distinct engagement with certain minor additions
            was, with the assistance of the Government of India, in due course, obtained: and on 18th
            January 1899, Lord Salisbury authorised you to give to the Secretary of Stale for India
            the assurance that Ilis Lordship “ did not contemplate that by according that assistance the
            Indian Government would in the slightest degreo pledge themselves to take any action, or to
            accept any liability under any circumstances that might arise in the future.” That under-
            t»king is still in force, and the distinction between the proposal for the protectorate on
            certain conditions which were never accepted by the Government of India, aud the non-alien­
            ation engagement which was obtained for Her Majesty’s Government by the Government of
            India at tho suggestion of the Secretary of Stato tor Foreign Affairs has never been lost
            sight of in the office.
               Circumstances have now arisen, in consequence of the engagement into which tho Sheikh
            of Koweit entered, which have led to the suggestions made by Sir N. O'Conor forwarded with
            your letter of the 30tb May. Tho proposals both with regard to Koweit and to Ncjd aro
            matters for the decisiou of tho Marquess of Lant-dnwne, and I am to forward, for His Lord-
            ship’s considoratiou, the opinion recorded by Lord Curzon. It is obvious that a declaration of
            open proteotorato over Koweit, and the deputation of a Mission to Ncjd, may involve serious
            responsibilities if the Turkish Government should eithor resent those measures or take steps to
            counteract thorn. The motives by which the Sheikh may be actuated ns suggested by tbo
            Viceroy, will not be confined to him. The Amir of Ncjd will equally be desirous of making
            the best bargain he can for himself by playing off one Power against another and, in Lord
            George Hamilton's opinion very little reliance can be pieced on the good faith of either.
            Engagements made to protect Koweit and to restrain the Sheikh from futuro aggression
            upon Nejd may lead to serious interference in the affairs of both Chiefs and to tbo establish­
            ment of authoritativo control, which might at times require a material force upon the spot for
            its cnforcomont. This forco tho Iudian Government cannot undertake to supply,
               Tn transmitting the Viceroy’s telegram for tho consideration of tbo Secretary of State for
            Foreign Affairs, I am to observe that Lord George Hamilton, whilst fully realising tho awk­
            wardness of allowing affairs iu Koweit to drift without a more defiuite declaration of policy
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