Page 182 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

IOC
Tho following telegram was addressed by Sir N. O’Conor to tbo Marquess
of Lansdownc on 16th March 1002
No. 445.
“I telegraphed to British Consul at 13.isr.ali on 5th March for his opinion ( ? as to)
Sheikh’s rights to Uin-Kasr and Bubiyan, but owing to interruption line his reply of 7th only
reached me to-day. It is as follows :—
No. 2G, March 7th. Your telegram No. 11. Survey of Um-Kasr Channel thows place
to be moat important and even belter adapted for railway terminus than Koweit. But while
it it highly desirable lo secure it, I fear Sheikh’s claim is very shadowy.
He asserts that it was occupied by Koweit people.in time of his grand-father, but
even if this be true, it has remained uninhabited for many years (? without his) exercising
any authority. He also says that Koweit now has sometimes used it as port for Basrah,
hut, on the other hand, Turks seem to have little claim beyond present occupation.
Bubiyan is on different fooling. It is regularly used as fishing ground for some
mon ths during year by Arabs acknowledging the Sheikh of Koweit and by no others. In my
opinion claim is good.
Sheikh has sent men to occupy Bubiyan. lie informed Senior Naval Officer that the
Bedawi who threatened Turkish troops at Um-Kasr were not his men, but Turkish subjects,
which hardly supports his claim as though Arabs themselves said that they recognized
the Sheikh. Ilis statements in general seem to he unreliable/’
With reference to his telegram of 4th March, Sir N. O'Conor wrote on
17th March 1902 to the Marquess of Lansdowne:—
“ I spoke to Minister, Foreign Affairs, to-day in sense of last paragraph of my telegram
No. GO of 11th March as authorised by Your
No. -ttC.
Lordship. I also told him that 1 was instructed
to remonstrate against the movements of troops in the vicinity of Koweit as tending to keep
country in a state of alarm and disturbance and to impede our eflorts to keep Sheikh of Koweit
quiet in accordance with agreement with Porte and His Excellency’s repeated request.
Minister, Foreign Affairs, assured me of desire of Ottoman Government to respect
status quo and arrangements made with Iiis Majesty’s Government, but he was not aware
of occupation of Bubiyan Island, though he knew that troops had been scat ta Um-Kasr.
Ho desired to inform me confidentially that real motive of these proceedings was anxiety to
keep debouebe for Baghdad Bailway under their own protection, as difficulties were raised about
extending it to Koweit. He believed that if English syndicate decided to participate in
this great enterprise, nothing more would be heard of such incidents. ”
Tho Foreign Office then took into consideration the wholo question,
and the following memorandum of the Marquess of Lansdownc, dated 21st
March 1902, should be read as showing the trend of the policy which tho
Foreign Office wished to pursuo:—
“The situation at Koweit is becoming more and moro embarrassing and the time has
come for looking it on the face.
We have saddled ourselves with an impossible client'in the form of the Sheikh.
He is appafently an untrustworthy savage. No one knows where his possessions begin and
end, and our obligations towards him are as ill-defined as the boundaries of his principality.
We have distinctly announced that he does not enjoy British “ protection ”; on the
other band, we once made him a present of 1,000/., and promised him our “good offices, ”
whatever that may m»*an. When wo made this promise we were, I feel no doubt, thinking of
Koweit proper, if there is 6uch a thing, aud not of Bubiyan or other outskirts over which
the Sheikh has rights of one sort or another. Wo have up to tho present sheltered ourselves
not unsuccessfully, during our discussion which tho Turks on the one sido and Foreign Govern­
ments on the otlicr, behind the plausible announcement that wo desired to maintain tho s/atus
quo in regard to Koweit. But 1 doubt whether any one really knows what the status quo is.
We have, at any rate in my opinion, no right to tell the Turks that they may not move troops
for the purpose of pulling down a rebellion in the Ncjd region, or that they must not look
for a suitable terminus of tho Baghdad Bailway for fear of disturbing the status quo.
: If matters arc left as they are, we shall involve ourselves in a very unsatisfactory disputo.
And we shall, as Admiral Bosanquet has lately pointed out, he obliged to keep tho squadron
on sentry go at the head of the Gulf in order to maiutain the peace.
_Wc might, it seems to mo, explain (1) to the Forte, (2) to the Sheikh, and (3) to the
Foreign Powers immediately the object of our policy.
I. should he inclined to say that our engagements to Koweit do not exlend beyond the
district adjoining or close to t lie hay of the name, and to endeavour to obtain the adhesion
of ttic Porie and of the Sheikh to an approximate definition of that district. It may ho
necessary to reconcile the Sheikh by the payment or another 1,000/., or of an oven larger sum.
I would make it dear to the Turks that wo do not want fo stand in the way of an
arrangement under which the terminus of the line might he placed at some ejx>t other than
Koweit to their advantage if they can make any tiling out of it.