Page 183 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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Ab to the Foreign Power?, I havo already explained lo most of them that we are not
going to oppose the Railway project, provided British Capital receives a share at least equal
to that of any other Bower in respect of construction, management, and orders for materials,
and I have added that while we do not grudge a debonehe for international commerce in the
Gulf, and have no wish to make it into a British lake, we'shall resist to tho utmost all
attempts by other Bowers to obtain a foothold on its shores for naval or military purposes.
This, I take it, is tho “ bed rock ” of our policy in the Gulf, and wo shall pursue that
policy not in virtue of ambiguous understandings with local Chiefs, but as the predominant
rower in Southern Persia and iu the Gulf: the Power whose commercial interests in those
regions far exceed those of other Powers, the Power to whose offorts in the past it is duo
that the waters of the Gulf are open to tho trade of the world, and whose duty it will be in the
future to protect the new trade route. It is understood that we have to be reckoned with,
whoever builds the railway, and wherever it finds a terminus, because wo nre that Power, we
can regaid with difference the local intrigues of any number of Sheikhs and Amirs/'
Upon this nnd nfter concirtrcnco of the India Office, the Foreign Office
despatched on 24th March the telegram which was repeated to the Viceroy
on 26th March (See telegram on page 57, paragraph 210 ante).
The communication made by Sir N. O'Conor to the Porte was reported in
the following:—
Despatch to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated 25th March 1902—
MI spoke to the Grand Vizier this afternoon about Kowcit iu obedience to the instruc­
tions contained in Your Lordship’s telegram No. 54 of yesterday.
I reminded Mis Highncssof the understanding that had been como to between His Majesty’s
Government and the Sublime Porte for the maintenance of the statu* quo in the strict and
loyal manner in which Ilis Majesty’s Government had on their part observed this agreement,
and of tbeir right, to expect, and even to demand, that the Ottoman Government would on
their side be equally loyal and sincere. Instead of this, they had not, I said, ceased, in one
way or another, to continually harass and molest the Sheikh, with a view to diminishing his
prestige or cncnnch upon his territories, thus creating a series of irritating discussions between
His Majesty’s Government and the Sublime Porte, which, I was confident, it was not His
Highness’s wish to encourage. I felt it was unnecessary, I added, to explain to His Highness
hew vastly our commercial interests in the Gulf exceeded those of all other foreign Powers,
and what a debt was duo to lingland for the way in which she had in tho past maintained
peace and comparative tranquillity in those waters and undertaken the heavy and respon­
sible task of a maritime police. We had no aggressive intentions against Turkey; our traditional
policy 'in the Gulf, as elsewhere, was to open the road to the trade of the world, but we had
interests of a high and impoitant order, both political and commercial, to protect, and we were
bound to sco that the Sheikh should not be attacked or molested, and we were prepared at
the same ’time to undertake that he docs not give the Ottoman Government any just cause
of complaint. I went on to say that I thought the Grand Vizier would be well advised in
doing all in his power to remove the grounds of complaints on the part of His Majesty’s
Government in insisting upon the status quo not being disturbed in any way, as had unfortu­
nately been the case by the advance of Turkish troops to places where the Sheikh appears
to havo exercised authority or. where, certainly, the Ottoman Government exercised none
whatever.
His Highness listened with attention, and said that, in the main, he agreed with my
remarks, and considered that the ogreement with His Majesty’s Government should be
faithfully observed. There was nn idea that we intended to block all access to the Gulf
for the Baghdad Railway ; but if this weio not 60, and they could, as 1 had told the Minister
for Foreign AfTairs, count upon our support, under certain conditions, in extending the railway
even to Kowoit, ho was distinctly of opinion that the interest of the Turkish Government
was to abide by the Agreement and cease all offorts to disturb the existing order of things. He
would consult with some of his colleagues on the matter beforo submitting a report to His
Imperial Majesty, and he hoped to be able to speak to me again on the subject within a few
days.
In discussing the question, T was obliged to avoid any reference to the question of th6
possible equal participation of British Capital in the construction of the Baghdad line, and
consequently to avoid using the arguments arising from such participation.'
The Sultan has, as far as I know, no knowledge of the negotiations for making the
railway an international concern, and he has also shown great sensibility on the subject,
and introduced into tho Concession a Clause (Article 8) forbidding the transfer of the railway
to any other Company.
Were I to mention the subject in such a way as to make it inoumbent on tho Grand
Vizier to report tho matter to tho Sultan, it might bo fatal to the negotiations botween tho
British and German groups for equal participation, besides getting tho Germans into more
serious difficulties. 1 could only say that perhaps British capitalists would subscribe towards
the construction; but oven upon this tho Grand Vizier took mo up at once, nnd it would not
be advisable to mention this phraso of tho question to Ilis Imperial Majesty and ho would
consider iny allusion to the subject as private and confidential.

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