Page 187 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat
P. 187

Ill
                8. As to the arras traffic with Koweit the question was,dealt with in a special despatch,*
                                           hut owing to the action of the Turks it has been
              • No. 7G, Secret E., <U'od 31it .Varcli 1904 ; Pro.
             No. GO, Secret B., May 1901, Nos. 48-GO.  decided f to defer for the present the introduc-
              , „   „              „       tion of measures for the prevention of the importa-
             1901 N°;. -sc3^ an'1 308 ('0, SoCr€l E" AuRU,t tion of arras at Koweit. Prior to this the Political
             1901.   8 7                   Resident, Persian Gulf, was informed* that
              l Pro. No. 310, ibid.        the deputation of the Assistant Surgeon might
                                           enable the furnishing of more complete and sys­
             tematic information regarding tho suspected traffic in arras at Koweit.
                C. O’H. T.,—21-8-01.

                C. H. C.,—24-8-04
                24-8-04.                                         L. Russell.
                25-8-Ot.                                        S. M. Fraser.
                                            Your Excelloncy called for the information in
                     Pago 109.
                                          the foregoing precis on 12th August 1904.
                25-8-04.                                         L. W. Danb.
               Tho sentonoo in Mr. Fraser’s proposed addition § to tho draft instructions to Captain
                     5 Paco 109           Kuox to which I particularly object is the
                     s “6   *             following
               “The policy of tho Government of India is to exclude Turkish influence in Nejd as far
            as possiblo, and to regard the proceedings of Ibn Saoud with friendly eye, as, if be recovers
            power, etc., etc/’
               This statoment is not homo out by tho authorities quoted and represents rather the
            wishes of the Foreign Department than tho policy of His Majesty’s Government.
               It might well lead a young officer, like Captain Knox, to take a more active line than
            His Majesty's Government iutend aud it might do harm if it leaked out at Koweit.
               The authority given for the statement that it is our policy “ to cxcludo Turkish influence
                                          in Nejd " is a telegram iu whioh Lord Curzon
             Pro. No. 323. Secret E., Auguit 1904, No*. 286-373.
                                          said, “ I would suggest that the Turks might
            again be warned against direct interference in affairs of Nejd, or it may bo necessary for His
            Majesty’s Government to take measures in those regions in order to protect British interests.'*
               I cannot see that these words justify the statement suggested by Mr. Fraser. No
            doubt we wish to exclude Turkish influence from Nejd, but to toll a young officer that this is
            our policy will have the effect of leading him to believe that wo mean to take active steps
                                          to enforce our wishes. So far from this being
             | Pro. No. «49, Secret E., Auguit 1904, No*. 286-373.
                                          the case, Sir N. O’Conor strongly|| objected to
            pressing tho Turks to desist from helping the Amir of NejJ.
               Again tho only authority given for the statement that it is our policy “ to regard the
            proceedings of Ibn Saood with a friendly eye" is the Foreign Secretary’s note of 18th May
            1904 (at page 12 of Proceedings, Secret E., August 1904, Nos. 2-37-373). That note says
                                         that our policy as stated in Lord Curzon’s tele­
              Pro. No. 629, Sccrot E., July 1901, Noi. 620-659.   gram^! of 81st July 1903 and in a despatch** of
             •• Pro. No/215, Juno 1904, No*. 2U7-218.
                                         24th March 1904, is to regard the proceedings of
            Ibn Saood with a friendly eye. But tbe telegram in question merely enumerates tho advantages
            of having a British officer at Koweit and does not contain a word of reference to Ibn Saood
            even  indirectly. Tho despatch states that if Ibn Saood succeeds in establishing his ascendancy
            ‘‘it maybe desirablo again to enter into relations with our old ally,"
               It seems to mo that, whon tho Foreign Secretary wroto bis note of I8th May 1904, his
            thoughts owed thoir parentago rathor to his own wishes than to the recorded papers.
               On tho other hand, wo have a telograraft from the Secretary of State, dated 8th February
             tt Pro. No. 211, Secret E., Juuu 1904, Nos.   1904, saying that “no steps should bo taken to
           207-218.                      entor into closer relations with Nejd," and Sir N.
             t; Pro. No«. 349-350, Secret E., August 1904, No*. O'Conor’s viow** that he ought not to appear as
           ,86'373,                      - distinct partisan of Bin Saood and that Bin
           Saood’s success is of doubtful advantage to us and might ovon be dangerous to our interests.
               As to this Ilis Majosty’s Govornraont do not appear to have pronounced any docision
           as yet.
               If thcro is to be any addition to tho draft instructions, such ns that proposed by Mr.
           Fraser, it must bo in striot accordance with tho polioy actually laid down by llis Majesty’s
           Government aud must not go beyond it.
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