Page 253 - Journal of Asian History_Neat
P. 253

luurmtl >'J t>o Awcrmw ()rmital Sonet t/, !)(i S (IS70)
         I'M
                 „ further report." implicated the gov-  Council look the initiative, moving from ita
        the report
             .„l «,f Ur ... Ill-’ H.w.l U=>li.l r.'volt a.-. well.”  previous position of passive caution to one of
         Henceforth there are  no more  references found  active support.
               muhnumc documents to Bahrein as “a        On the twelfth and thirteenth of that month
        in the
                   hmitled to the state” and therefore   firmans wore issued by the Imperial Council to
        territory su
        protected.  Should another governor general    LahsA, Bagdad and Basra. In the case of the fir­
        show himself anxious to invade Bahrein he would   man to Bagdad, the intention was to gain inde­
        find the Imperial Council insistent on careful   pendent informed testimony on the truthfulness >
        planning and execution but otherwise prepared   of the Lahsfi reports.
        to support him.
          Thirteen years later such a situation arose.   To the governor general of Bagdad:         :
                                                                                                    :•
        Early in the spring of 15715, the judge of Lahsa   The governor general of LahsA has sent a report saying
        reported to the Imperial Council that Bahrein   that the conquest of the fort on Bahrein is aa easy
                                                       matter, that the defending troops arc few, and that tho ;
        was a prosperous   island with more than 300   ships now stationed at Basra would suffice for the cam- ,
        villages (karyc) and that it would be a simple
                                                       paign. Hastiness cannot be accepted; careful preparation :
        matter to seize it. The reply, addressed to the   is important. You have in the past held the position of ,
        governor general of Lahsii was couched largely   governor general of Lahsii and know the facta. I there-.’
        in the form of questions. What are the sources   fore order that careful plans be made. How many galleys .*
        of the judge’s information? How reliable are they?   and fighting men (marines? cenkfI) would in fact bo:
                                                       necessary? ... Is it likely that the Portuguese ships at
        Are the troops of Bahrein in fact weak? If so,
                                                       Hormuz will come in reprisal? The governor general of
        why? How would you undertake the conquest?     Lahs& reported that the island if conquered would yield ,
        If additional troops would be needed, how many?   (annually! 40,000 fildri. In fact, if the fxardc is ignored,,
        When should they arrive in Labsa? What equip­  what would the income be? That much? More? . . .“
        ment would be needed? Just how much income
                                                         The firmans to Lafosa and Basra, however,
        would be derived from this conquest?51 I found
                                                       convey no hint that the Imperial Council had
        no mention of a reply to this request for informa­
                                                       any major reservations concerning the campaign.^
        tion; perhaps none was made. Sinfin, governor
                                                       In the orders to Lafysa are requests for clarification '
        general of Lahsa, died shortly after and the prov­
                                                       of several support problems, the availability of
        ince was administered temporarily by the gover­
        nor general of Basra until a new appointment was   iron for cannon and cannon balls, sufficient 1
                                                       troops and transportation ;s* the orders to Basra :
        confirmed on or before June tenth, 1574.52
          The campaign was far from forgotten, how­    are in the same vein, with a cautionary note to.C
        ever. Even before the new appointment troops   cooperate fully with Lahs& on all matters con-"
        were moved into Lafisfi from Basra.54 Ilyas    ceming the campaign.57
        Bey, the new governor general, once he had es­   Simultaneous with and within three weeks oLi
                                                       these queries, five more orders went out to Iraq|
        tablished himself, turned promptly to the  cara-
        paign plans. In June of 1575 he corresponded with   and Syria, all related to supplies for the cam-3
        Istanbul on  the question of ships that would be  paign. The machinery of war was slowly pushed!
        required.54 But it was not until November that the  into motion. To Aleppo went orders to send lum-3
                                                       ber to Basra via Birecik, and if they could be3
          " Ibid.
                                                       spared tools and equipment for shipbuilding.1®
          “M 22:92, 10 $afer 981/11 June 1573. The judge’a
        report is summarized in the narralio.          To Diyarbekir went a request for 500
          11 M 24:911, 19 Safer 982/10 June 1574.
          M M 2-4:913, 15 Safer 982/6 June 1574. 400 Janissaries   11 M 27:200, 9 $a’bAn 983/13 November 1575.
        were  sent to Basra to replace them; there is no other   " M 27:19. 8 S*’bin 983/12 November 1575. Clear!;
        indication of the size of the transfer.        miacopied as if addressed to Basra.
        .. M .Cyli 3: P' m> 18 $,Jer S®/® May 1575; and   »T M 27:206, 9 $a’b&n 983/13 November 1575.
        M teyh 3: p. 128. 22 Safer 983/2 June 1575.      M M 27:203, same date.













                                • •*.       • ••              , %
   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258