Page 27 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
P. 27

14                      Arabia, the Gulf and the West


               It would have been a strange application of our principles to insist that the Adenese,
               being urban and relatively sophisticated, should be allowed to decide the question of
               merger by their own vote, while the inhabitants of the original Federation, although five
               times as numerous and no less vitally concerned, should not be consulted at all -
               presumably on the theory that as illiterate rifle-carrying tribesmen they somehow
               counted as second-class human beings.


                  No one, in fact, except the rump of the Aden Association, wanted inde­
               pendence for Aden alone. All knew that Aden was the natural leader of the
               federation: half the seals in the new federal legislature were allotted to it, and
                its wealth, its experience, its mercantile and technical resources, all ensured its
                eventual primacy. But for the young, frantically ambitious nationalists of Aden
                the idea of sharing power with the traditional rulers of the hinterland was
                abhorrent. They wanted power for themselves alone, securing it first in Aden
                through the diversionary campaign for the colony’s independence, and after­
                wards in the protectorate, by calling in the Yemenis and Egyptians to crush the
                hereditary rulers. What was more, they wanted nothing to do with Britain,
                with British constitutional proposals, and least of all with British defensive
                guarantees. These sentiments only endeared them more to their champions
                among the British left, who were further gratified when the Aden TUC
                spawned a political party in 1962 with the pious title of the ‘People’s Socialist
                Party’ (PSP) to fight for the colony’s independence from British rule. What its
                sympathizers and apologists in Britain failed to grasp about the Aden TUC,
                however, was that it and the People’s Socialist Party were one and the same
                 thing, in leadership, membership and programme, and that its aims and
                 methods were a long way removed from those of Transport House. Instead,
                 they looked benignly upon the Aden TUC as something akin to the British
                 trade union movement, and upon Abdullah al-Asnaj as a kind of fledgling
                 Ernest Bevin. Two Labour members of Parliament, George Thomson and
                 Robert Edwards, who accepted an invitation from the Aden TUC in June 1962
                 to ascertain for themselves the state of opinion in the colony about the merger,
                 found themselves on arrival being paraded about Aden by their hosts and
                 inveigled into making speeches to the Yemeni workers. They were then taken
                 surreptitiously across the frontier into the Yemen to meet some exiled,
                 nationalist ‘patriots’ — all without realizing that their presence was being
                 advertised as evidence of the British Parliamentary Labour Party’s support of
                 the People’s Socialist Party.
                    On 26 September 1962, against a background of riots and street demon­
                 strations organized by the PSP, the Aden legislature voted for Aden’s acces­
                 sion to the Federation of South Arabia. That same night in Sana, the capital of
                 the Yemen, a group of army officers, financed, indoctrinated and armed by the
                 Egyptians, overthrew the government of the imam and proclaimed a republic.
                 The old Imam Ahmad had died a week previously, and his son and successor,
   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32