Page 344 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
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The Masquerade                                            341


          ominous when, at the beginning of December 1970, the government of Ven­
          ezuela raised its tax rate to 60 per cent and arrogated to itself the right to set

          posted prices unilaterally.
             A week later, on 9 December, the twenty-first meeting of OPEC opened at
          Caracus. Half a dozen resolutions were passed, of which the key one was
          Resolution XXI-120. It provided for a minimum 55 per cent tax rate for all

          member countries, the elimination of disparities in posted prices by taking the
          higher price as the norm (with allowances for gravity factors and geographic
          location), a uniform increase to reflect the improvement in the world
          petroleum market, the adoption of a new gravity escalation system and -

          somewhat inconsistently - the abolition of all differential allowances among
          OPEC members. There were other resolutions. One provided for the estab­
          lishment of a committee to discuss production levels; another for the compul­
          sory reinvestment of oil company earnings in the producing countries; and yet

          another for two factors of recent origin to be taken into account in determining
          the level of posted prices, viz. the decline in the international value of the US
          dollar and the rise in the cost to OPEC’s members of imported manufactures.
          The attainment of these various aims was entrusted to a negotiating group of

          Gulf oil-producing countries which was to begin discussions with rhe oil
          companies at Tehran within thirty-one days. The Gulf group was to report to
          the full body of OPEC no later than seven days after the end of the negotia­

          tions, and OPEC was to meet to evaluate the results within a further fifteen
          days. Should the negotiations ‘fail to achieve their purpose’, the relevant
          resolution concluded, the member countries of OPEC would take ‘concerted
          and simultaneous action’ to secure the desired results.

             The Caracas resolutions signalled the end, for all practical purposes, of
          separate agreements between oil companies and individual governments over
          oil prices and tax rates. Henceforth, any concession granted to one country
          would rapidly and inevitably be demanded by another, starting a chain reac­

          tion which would eventually bring in every member of OPEC. The Caracas
          Conference also made plain - to anyone, that is, whose eyes were not clouded
          by trust or hope - that the distinction which supposedly existed between
          moderate and radical members of OPEC was an illusion. The representatives
          of the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab governments at the conference were fully as

          vocal as those of the ‘radical’ regimes in their acclamation of the Libyan junta’s
          triumph a few months earlier, and in their approval of the new demands
           ormulated by the conference. Whether they were driven to assume this

          fe°Slt*on’as has been alleged on their behalf by their apologists in the West, by
            ar 0 the consequences of appearing less aggressive and anti-imperialist than
         easiireVb^Ut^°nary Arah governments is really beside the point. (It might as
           asi y e argued that the whole ‘moderate/radical’ business was merely a

          to^l?1111111,6 to guh an impressionable Western audience.) What is more
                e P°lnt is that the Caracas demands revealed with brutal clarity the
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