Page 349 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

346 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

al-Yamani, the Saudi minister of petroleum, Jamshid Amuzegar, the Persian
minister of finance, and Saadun al-Hammadi, the Iraqi oil minister. The
deadline laid down at Caracas for the completion of negotiations was still
operative; so, too, was the threat of a shut-down of oil production if satisfactory
terms had not been agreed by 3 February. At the preparatory meeting the

companies’ representatives explained that they were not yet empowered to
negotiate on the increases demanded by OPEC, and the meeting was there­
upon adjourned. On 16 January the collective message to OPEC was delivered
to the organization’s constituent governments. The initial reactions to it were
fairly muted. Amuzegar in Tehran challenged the validity and practicability of
an attempt to negotiate with OPEC as a body, saying that if the companies
persisted in it the organization would respond by adopting what he called the
‘crazy demands’ of the Libyans as a. common denominator.
Much the same reception was accorded the joint message in Tripoli. The oil
minister, Izzedin Mabruk, summoned the representatives of Bunker Hunt and
Occidental on 16 January’ to remind them of the ultimatum delivered to the
independents earlier in the month, and to threaten and cajole them alternately
in an effort to persuade them to break away from the combined negotiations.
He and Major Jallud tried the same approach three days later, wrhen they

harangued the representatives of Esso about the ‘poisoned letter’, as they called
the joint message. There was no doubt that they were shaken by it, to such an
extent that they allowed three consecutive ultimata to Bunker Hunt to expire
without taking punitive action. In conversations with the companies’ represen­
tatives they revealed that what worried them most was the companies’ refusal
to entertain any demands for retroactive tax payments or new reinvestment
obligations, two desiderata which were close to the Libyans’ hearts. They
could rake up no plausible reasons for objecting to a collective OPEC settle­

ment: indeed, Jallud was reduced to complaining feebly that he was being
asked to negotiate with oil companies which did not operate in Libya. This was
a palpable lie: all the Persian Gulf producers at that time, with the exception of
Gulf Oil, also operated in Libya. What clearly emerged from what was, for the
Libyans, a meek and mild response to the companies’ joint message was that
Jallud and his rais, Qaddafi, were taking their colour from the Algerians with
whom they were in close touch and who had also reacted to the companies
message in subdued fashion. All the signs indicated that a critical juncture had
been reached in the contest between the companies and OPEC, and that a firm
approach by President Nixon’s special envoy could well prove decisive.
Irwin arrived in Tehran on 17 January. Accompanied by the American
ambassador to Persia, Douglas MacArthur (nephew of the general), he had a
meeting with the shah, the Persian prime minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, and the
finance minister, Amuzegar. What transpired at this meeting, and at a further

meeting between Irwin and Amuzegar, is not entirely clear, although its
general content can be deduced from evidence which has subsequently come to