Page 348 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
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The Masquerade 345
Germany and Hispanoil of Spain, were already beginning to range themselves
alongside the original signatories of the message to OPEC. In the third week of
January two groups of company representatives were assembled, one in
London, the other in New York, to co-ordinate the companies’ moves. The
London Policy Group, as it was called, was made responsible for drawing up
terms of reference for the representatives who were to negotiate with OPEC
on behalf of the companies in Tehran and Tripoli, and for modifying the
negotiators’ instructions and answering their queries. The New York group
was to review and comment upon policy proposals made in London, and to
provide technical information. Diplomatic exchanges had also taken place
among the United States, British, French, Dutch and Japanese governments.
The French were then undergoing their own trial by fire, as will be seen later
on, over their oil concessions in Algeria, while the Japanese were alarmed by
the prospect of yet higher oil prices. There was, however, no co-ordination of
efforts by these governments comparable to that being made by the oil com
panies. What was more disturbing, there was no evidence of any strong
governmental disposition to back the companies’ stand.
On 15 January the chief executive officers of the major companies and the
leading independents, with McCloy in attendance, had a meeting at the State
Department with the secretary of state, William Rogers, and the under
secretary, John Irwin II. The oilmen emphasized the necessity of maintaining a
collective approach to OPEC and the desirability of the United States
government’s supporting the companies, especially by persuading the OPEC
governments to moderate their demands and to follow fair bargaining prac
tices. Rogers accepted the advice, along with the further proposal that a
personal envoy from President Nixon should be dispatched without delay to
the shah, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the shaikh of Kuwait, carrying with
him letters from the president to the three rulers. It would be the envoy’s task,
firstly, to explain why the United States government was permitting the
American oil companies to negotiate jointly; secondly, to prevent the possible
interruption of oil supplies should negotiations reach an impasse; and, finally,
to seek assurances from the Gulf oil states of the continued supply of oil at
reasonable prices to the free world. At the suggestion of Akins, who was
present at the meeting, the under-secretary of state, Irwin, was selected for the
mission. He left for Tehran the next day, accompanied by Akins. Since Irwin
was not conversant with the oil industry, and there had been no time to brief
him adequately, it was obvious that he would have to rely for guidance on oil
matters upon Akins.
Meanwhile the representatives of the companies had had a preliminary
meeting in Tehran on 12 January with the Gulf Committee of OPEC, which
had been charged with implementing the resolutions adopted by the organiza
tion at Caracas in December. The Gulf Committee, representing Saudi Arabia,
ersia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi, was made up of Ahmad Zaki