Page 353 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

350 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

thwarting, or even questioning, the shah’s wishes over the manner in which the
discussions between OPEC and the oil companies were to be conducted. Only
the Dutch ambassador at Tehran doubted the wisdom of yielding to the shah’s
wish to split the negotiations into two, for he recognized that capitulation on
this score would immediately rob the companies’ combined message to OPEC

delivered only two days previously, of its entire force. What part James Akins
may have played in Irwin’s volte face is not ascertainable from the evidence
available, although it would not be illogical to assume that it was in keeping
with the complaisant attitude he had adopted towards the Libyan putsch some
months earlier. Nothing, it would seem, least of all the turn of events, would
alter Akins’s faith in the virtue and seemliness of acceding to whatever
demands OPEC might make. At the meeting-of oil company representatives
held at the State Department the previous September he had pooh-poohed the
idea that the other Middle-Eastern oil states would be encouraged by Libya’s
example to demand higher prices and tax rates. He was, as one of the British

oilmen recalled with some disgust, ‘hypnotized by the Saudi Arabians. He said
that there was no question of Saudi Arabia following Libya. I said you must be
joking, and nearly walked out.’* At the Caracas conference Saudi Arabia had
followed Libya, yet Akins’s ardent belief, both in the reasonableness of the
Saudis and in propitiation as the cardinal principle of diplomacy, remained,
and was to remain, unshaken.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Irwin’s decision at Tehran was that
he took it without making any effort to consult the oil companies. George T.
Piercy, a director of Esso, and Lord Strathalmond, managing director of BP,

were due to reach Tehran early on 19 January to lead the oil companies’ side in
the negotiations with OPEC. Irwin did not see fit to wait the few hours until
their arrival before sending his recommendation to Washington. Indeed, he
did not even wait to see them after he had sent it, but flew off instead to Riyad.
Piercy and Strathalmond were apprised of the outcome of Irwin’s mission
when they met MacArthur, Wright and the French and Dutch ambassadors on
their arrival. They were also told that word had been received from Washing­
ton that the secretary of state, Rogers, had endorsed Irwin’s recommendation
in favour of separate negotiations with the Gulf States, and was urging the 01

companies to comply with it. Piercy immediately protested that to do so wou
set at naught the message to OPEC delivered only three days earlier Fur er
more, he questioned whether the past history of oil agreements in the 1
East gave cause for confidence that the Gulf States would honour any price
settlement they might reach, especially if the companies were s“bse^ue" y
be forced to concede a ludicrously high price for Libyan oil. Mac r ,

whom these views were expressed, seemed incapable of gra^ping houid
stake. Instead, he kept urging upon Piercy and Strathalmond that y
content themselves with a separate negotiation with the Gulf states.

*
• Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters, p. 227