Page 418 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

The ‘Sting* 415

their minds for any thought other than how best to propitiate the Arabs, who,
they suggested, might be persuaded to enter into arrangements for the steady
supply of oil in return for technical and industrial aid and a copious flow of
European manufactures. Heath’s altitude, which was largely instrumental in
frustrating any hope of European solidarity, defies understanding. He sorely
needed, and the ailing British economy even more, the financial assistance
which would have been forthcoming from the regional development fund the
Community was endeavouring to establish. The bulk of the money for the fund
was to be subscribed by Germany; yet Heath refused to heed Brandt’s call for
equality of sacrifice in dealing with the oil crisis. Instead, he bent his efforts, as
did Pompidou, towards appeasing the Arabs.
Nothing of the remotest consequence was accomplished at Copenhagen,
except a further demonstration of Europe’s infirmity of will. Even after the
conference had ended uncertainty remained as to why Bouteflika and Pachachi
had made their journey, especially as the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia,
Morocco and Tunisia never put in an appearance. The Sudanese foreign
minister turned up when the conference was over, delivered himself of some
blague about the Western world gobbling up the Arabs’ oil as it had gobbled up
Africa’s grain (‘bringing death and famine to millions’) and disappeared into
the bled. The dithering at Copenhagen, however, was immensely cheering to
the oil ministers of OPEC, who were due to gather at Tehran the following
week to decide how best to profit from the seller’s market in oil. At auctions of
participation crude held in early December bids of $16 a barrel, and even in one
instance of $17.90 a barrel, had been made (although in some cases the buyers
later revoked their offers). Europe and Japan were plainly sheep ready for the
fleecing, and to this agreeable task the OPEC ministers applied themselves at
Tehran on 22 December.
Before the proceedings opened, however, there was the customary, obligat­
ory abjuration by Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani of any avaricious intent on the part of
OPEC, a ritual patter which was an essential prologue, as well as a frequent
epilogue, to any performance of OPEC’s peripatetic sacred drama. While in
London, Yamani had stated that the Arab oil states wished to establish an
oil-pricing system which was ‘fair and reasonable’ to producing and consuming
countries alike. ‘We will be more than happy’, he assured his respectful
listeners, ‘to sit down with the consumers and listen to their views and discuss
with them our problems.’ Three weeks later, while passing through Beirut on
his way to Tehran, he graciously expressed his solicitude for the consuming
countries’ welfare. The high prices that oil was fetching at auction, he declared
by way of comfort, should not be taken as a basis for determining the price of
oil. ‘[They] reflect to a large extent the effects of the oil embargo and cut-back
measures taken by the Arab oil-producing countries, and since these measures
are of a political nature, they should not have an economic effect.’ Yamani was
prepared to go further to demonstrate the essential moderation of his views: