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Part V-Chap. XXVII.             109
           ii sfliciont in their estimation; and that thoy arc consequently desirous o£ uniting with us
           to inforce its observance by others who hnve subscribed to it.
               23. Sheikhbooth the Chief of Boothabeo arrivod in m y camp on tho 11th instant, and
           exprossod a great dcsiro to enter into friondly and strict re lations with tho British Govern-
           meat. I have accordingly mado with him the accompanying preliminary engagement and
           admitted him to subscribe tho General Treaty.
                           *          *          *                     *
               25.  It will be npparent to tho Honourable tho Governor in Council that I have eagerly
           seized what I considered a most favourable moment for tho conclusion of these engagements
           le6t in tiro fluctuations of human affairs, and in the time required for previous sanction, it
           should havo boon lost for over. Thoso wero indeed opportunities not to be overlooked for
           confirming nnd perpotunting tho effects of our previous military operations, and for executing
           tho spirit and lettor of my instructions to suppress pirnoy. The stato of affairs on this
           coast called for sorno decided demonstration of what was likely to bo our fuluro wishes, siuce
           wo had shown our power to accomplish them, and all who hnd boon made sensible of this,
           awaited with much anxiety, a pledge that would set at rest all their apprehensions, and I
           humbly conceivo that any delay in granting this would not havo been becoming, particu­
           larly as tho annulment of all that ha9 been oxecuted under these ideas oould not occasiou
           greater perploxity than before oxisted.
               26.  Then as to tho omission of any mention of British allies in tho treaty, Sir W. Grant
           observes : The distinct introduction into the General Treaty of any of our former allies has
           been avoided from tho bcliof that their religious and personal animosities added to their
           habits of indecision and procrastination, might prove a bar to the conclusion, and afterwards
           tho due observance of any compact with which they might bo directly conneoted with us,
           and these reasons for their omission will probably .appear stranger; when it is reoollected,
           how liable their interests are to fluctuation, and that a change in the views of any one Power,
           would interfere with the operation of the whole system, and consequently thwart the inten­
           tions of tho British Government in entering into such arrangements ; at the  same time it is
           apparent that all the advantages which the allies could derive from tho introduction of their
           names into the General Treaty might be secured to them by tbeir entering through the
           mediation of the British Government into special treaties, generally, or individually, with
           the Arab tribes, recognising at the same time that which has now been conoluded. This
           would leave the British Government perfectly unembarrassed in the pursuit of its own views,
           an object which must be at all times desirable.
              27.  Under this conviction I havo transmitted to Muscat to His Highness the Iraaum
           who had proceeded towards that place previous to the conclusion of the General Treaty, a
           communication intimating ray belief that the British Government would most readily
           recognise by a special treaty, that acts of piracy committed against His Highness, or his
           eubjoets, should be lookod upon in the same light as committed against its own, and would
           guarantee free admission of His Highness's subjeote nnd vessels into the port of the Arabs,
           understanding that a reoiprocal admission shall be given to them into the ports of His
           Highness.
              28.  I have likewise intimated that His Highness's formal recognition to Bombay of the
           treaty now entered into would probably be very acceptable to the British Government, as
           would an offer on his part to act against the Arabs, in the event of their committing any
           breach of it. To prevent mistakes or misrepresentations I have transmitted for His Highness's
           information copies of all the engagements iuto which I have entered with the Arabs, from the
           conviction that such public proceedings which must be matters of notoriety, although not
           yet ratified by the Governor in Council would be transmitted with great advantage in a
           complete form.
              29.  His Highness had been made acquainted previous to his leaving Rassul-Khirna, that
           these treaties were in progress, and should have been put ia possession of the whole, had it
           been possible to complete them before bis departure, the day previous to which Captain
           Thompson, my interpreter, waited upon His Highness to commuoioate the substance of the
           foregoing proposals, which seemed to be received with great satisfaction.
              80. Shortly after the transmission of my despatoh of the 6th instant the Irnaum intimated
           daring an interview with me his desire to return to Muskat, and directly avowed that his
           iutontion in proceeding there was to make preparations for an independent attack on Bahrein,
           as adverted to in the Slst paragraph of my despatch of the 6th. His Highness at the same
           time begged to know whether I had any objections to his doing so now, as he considered the
           service in. which he had been engaged with us to be at an end, and pressed me to inform him
           whether his proceeding to Bahrein would be disagreeable to the British Government. I replied
           that His Highness being an independent Priuce must at all times be at liberty to act in con­
           formity to his ideas of wbafc was safe; with regard to his proceeding to Bahrein, it was impossible.
           I oould give him any opinion, nnd as my instructions did not relate to that point, I could not
           form any judgment of what the views of my Government might be, but if the Iraaum
           would commit to writing any proposals he had to make or questions he wished to ask in the
           event of .my not being able to givo an immediate reply, I should forthwith forward his
           communication to Bombay. His Highness intimated that this should be done in the evening,
           and stated that he should proceed to Maskat next day. In the evening I received a message
           from His Highness, stating that he did not intend writing to me on the subject that bo had
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