Page 136 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

111 Part V—Chap. XXVII
acting1 in this mannor l»oon moro dcoply impressed upon the minds of all oonoemed than it ie
at this moment.
(8) I stalo with gr-'nt doforcnco that I still conceivo tho general omission of articles that
would bo occasionally evaded, whilst tho means of maintaining cur will remains, is likely to
hnvo n better offoct than elipulatiug for what wo wero not to demand on all occasions; as
tho latter would in some measure impose obligation on ourselves, as well ns line of couduot
that might at timoa provo inconvenient and embarrassing.
(9) 1 shall now proceed to a consideration of tho additions which tho Governor in Counoil
is disposed to introduce into tho “ General Treaty.11
(10) Tho capture of the war vessels and dismantling of the forts of tho pirnlionl Chiefs
1ms already boon reported, but it will ho observed that a considerable numbor of the former
wore given up, and some of the latter destroyed under the preliminary troatioa ; I take the
liberty of recurring to tlicso considerations as they are not mentioned rv< “ principaln
advantages gained by t.lio picsent treaty, whilst tho promise of tho Arab Chiefs to abandon
piracy is first pointed out as one of them. Tho latter stipulation it is truo belongs to the
u General Treaty", whilst tho former is in those that were preliminary, but I have over
reckoned that a consideration of both together was necessary to tho appreciation of tho advan­
tages othor of tho gcueinl or preliminary treaties.
(11) The Govornor in Council conceivos that it would have been desirable to remove
nil Chiefs concorned in piraev, or likely to afford any countenance to the practice of that
enormity; to detain in custody all -suoh Chiefs as havo rendered themselves particularly
obnosiou« by their practice or countenance of piracy, and had fallen into our bands in the
coureo of our operations together with their piratical adherents, and to s*t up in their stead
suoh Chiefs as could bo depeuded on for their discouraging piraoy, if no such could bo found,
to make over tho country to the Iraaura, to prohibit the filling out of armed vessels of every
description at ports that havo been accustomed to practice piracy ; to limit the size of those
allowed for commercial purposes so as to render them easily resisted if applied to piracy; and
to stipulate for the right of search and of capturing all such as should be found to transgress
this prohibition. To restrain the exportation from India of timber for building largo ships.
Prohibiting their (tho Arabs) rebuilding thoir forts and stipulating for tho right of landing and
destroying any works that they might attempt to raise and others of tho 6ame nature.
(12) To remove all Chiefs ooncerned in piracy or likely to afford any countenance to the
practice of that enormity must have involved tho contingency of my leaving the sea coast iii
tho event of any chieftain moving info the country as Sultan-biu-Suirger aotually did previous
to his signing any treaty. I was restrained from pursuing the contingency mentioned by
many considerations, the most immediate, of cours**, was the following paragraph in my ins­
tructions doted the 2/th of October : “ And you will not fail to bear in raiud that excepting
in oases of pnrtioular emergency neither tho troops nor the crows of the ships of
war, nor of the Hon'ble Company’s cruizers, are meant to be employed at any distauce from
thence (Kussulkbimab) or any other place to which your operations may be directed
against any military forces of the piratical States unless their being so employed should be
found essentially requisite for the demolition of tho piractical vessple and craft which may
be in their ports. Sharga Sultan-bin-Suggcr’s chief port, as well as other places, might have
beeu destroyed without entering into any treaty whatever, but it is n t to be supposed that
this chieftain would have voluntarily placed himsolf in my power and consented to any treaty
or stipulations confirming his own disposition whilst he was at the head of his petplo, and tho
desert of Arabia was open to him. I had not any other moans to resort to under my positive
instructions not to quit the coast, except in that of entering into recognitions, which I
accordingly did with the view of obtaining what must have appeared to the world a strong
manifestation of tho effects of our previous military operations. 1 had resolved on the destruc­
tion of the fortifications as well as of the vessels, and I oonceived th.it greater advantage would
be derived from accomplishing this on tho footing it is placed by the treaties than by cutting
off all the friendly communication, and annulling thereby all hopes of future improvement, nor
did I believe that any benofit could arise from the display of our military power in the capture
aud destruction of foitifioations and vessels, whilst we should in all probability have re­
embarked uudor the firs of tho very euemy we had beaten, and who must have gathered
confidence from our departure under such circumstances, lly treating men and time were
saved, and our military power was acknowledged by a peaceable surrender of the maritime
force of the Joasmcs, which my iuslruotions pointed out to be tho object of the expedition.
(13) With regard to retaining such Chiefs and their followers as might fall into our
hands in the course of our operations, and setting other Chiefs up in their stead, I shall offer
the following consideration. The Hon'blo the Governor iu Council has pleased to express
his approbation of the terms grauted to Hassan-bin-Rahmn whose case is viewed uuder
peculiar circumstances. The only chieftain and people therefore who may bo considered
ns having fallen into our hands iu tho course of our operations are Ilasenn-bin-Ali and hi«
followers. Knowing tho peculiar char&oter of this Chieftain, I at first felt disposed
to prevent his re-establishment at Zaya although it had beeu completely destroyed;
that place and the territory belonging to it was accordingly offered to His Highness
the Imaum, who declined to accept of it. Hero then remained in my possession a single
Chieftain and one hundred and seventy-seven followers. I am not aware of the existence
of uny Chief that could he depended on to set up in Hasean-bin-Ali's stead ; the alternative
suggested of offering tho territory iu question to the Imaum bud beeu resorted to without