Page 137 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

Port V-Chop. XXVII. 115
success; I consequently followed whnt nppoared to mo to bo tho boat course, and roleased him
and bis followers. Ilad Ha6san-bin-Ali boon retained, and another person set up iu his stead
by tho British authority, tho Chief so created would uaturnlly have looked to no for support
and protection ; wo should have put him up for our own benefit; but as that advantage would
havo beon immediately lost had auy Chief in whom wo had no trust been pleased to romovo him,
wo should have folt it incumbent upon us to support tho persou who was iu our own intorcsts ;
any person set up in the room of Ha«san-bin-Ali would havo been a solitary instance of our
intorferenco in tho internal affairs of tho Arab tribes. If tho influonoo of tho person so situ­
ated had beou powerful, he would still havo looked to our countenance, if it had been weak ho
would havo required our active support, ho would have been our man, and our charaoter would
lmvo boon committed lmd we abandoned him, nor could wo have had any further focurity from
him than hin promises, but that is of little conscquenco, as tho security remains with ourselves.
Hassan-bin-Ali hud promised not to practice plunder and piracy, but ho is awaro that thero ie
a British forco in tho Gulf for maintaining this promise in its fullest extent. Our ow n
Chief w«uld havo promised tho eamo things, but I submit that wo could not on that account
havo diminished tho forco to retain ono man. As affairs now 6tand when our garrison shall
bo withdrawn from Hussulkhiyma, our political connection with Arabia may ccaso from that
moment, and this I have ever considered to bo very great advantage.
(14) Had I known any person, or had there beou nny person iu Ilassan-bin-Ali’s tribe
nearly equal in powor to that Chieftain and who in tho natural course of event had succeeded
to tho Government of tho tribe, from Hassan-bin-\li’s confinement, advantage might have
been desired from permitting the person who had thus succeeded without our interference,
to remain in powor, but as far as my information goes no such person appeared, 1 had oue
othor political inducement to release Hassau-bin-Ali, whioh was that at tho timo this moa6uro
was carried into effect, he was tho person most ablo as well ns willing to maintain somo
balance in the authority on tbo coast against Sultau-bin-Sugger.
(15) Ha6eau bin Ali's followers wore released as I havo before observed, under the idea
that ovou their enmity can he productive of no bad consequences at this period, thoy were
suffering much from disease, aud I verily believe that wo should not havo been long burtbened
with tho care of many of them, thoir deaths whilst under confinement by us would not havo
oreated a favourable political impression, which 1 trust their release has. I did not look to
their deserts, but I looked to placing the British elnraoter in tho most advantageous point of
view; this of course not to bo done without some sacrifices, if not iu reality, at least, of opinion,
I canuot regret any that I havo incurred, excepting being doprived of the approbation of the
Governor in Council to a measure which appeared to mo one that could be pursued with the
greatest advantage.
(10) I did not prohibit the fitting out of armed vessols of every dosoription at porls
that have been accustomed to the practice of piracy as we considered that wo always maintain
the power of doing bo ; which I did not conceive that it was the desire or policy of the
British Government to prohibit the U6e, but only tho abuse of such vessels. In disarming a
people or in preventing them from defending their persona and property whether by sea or
land, we may fairly 1 think be said to charge ourselves with their protection against all who
shall attack them unjustly. Wo are not the sole p >wor in the Gulf of Persia and our entire
repugnance to involve ourselves in tho politics of the Gulf is, I boliovo, maintained, and made
still moro apparent by our not interfering directly with the quarrels and wars that may arise
in it; it was this idea that caused me to disoourage tho Imaum only by arguments and
remonetrancos against bis attack on Bahrein. I did not moan to interfere actively in this
or any other acknowledged war, which was defined iu tho General Treaty to bo that whioh is
proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government.
(17) I felt disinclined to limit the 6ize of vessels allowed for commercial purposes as
understood that the largest were not by any means the most frequently used piratioally ;
and as the introduction of commercial habits and ideas muoh to be desired I was willing to
impose as few impediments to tboir adaption as a sense of safety would permit whilst I havo
every confidence in tho efficacy and practicability of a strict maritime superintendence. The
Gulf of Persia is a very small and confined 6ea, through which information will circulate
rapidly, and no act of piraoy can iu future be committed without early intelligence being
received at the British settlement, of where, and by whom, it may have beon perpetrated,
when immediate steps may be takou to infliot the necessary puuishment on such as may
offend.
(18) The right of search I conceive to be recognized in the obligation to have particular
papers.
(19) As any restraint on the exportation from India of timber for building large ships
could not be imposed by me, I do not trouble the Government with any observations on that
head.
(20) For the reasons given in the 7th paragraph of this letter I conceive that we
have every right to prohibit the Arabs from rebuilding their forts, ns well as of landing and
destroyiug any works they may attempt to raise for the purpose of enabling thorn to carry on
piraoy.
(21) Tho Hon'ble the Governor in Council oouceives that a breach of the present
treaty exposes him (any Arab Chief) to no consoquencos whioh would not have resulted from
his piraoy had that agreement (tho General Treaty) never been entered into. Tho commis­
sion of an aot of piracy would place the persons committing it beyond the pale of any treaty,