Page 135 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

Port V-Chap. XXVII. 113
should bo of opinion that ho will be ablo to hold it. Should ho refuse to reoeivo or ho in yoar
judgment unable to dofond it, the Governor in Council is ploasod to authorize you to mako it
ovor to any of tho local Chiefs making uso of such a transfer to obtain tho consent of as many
as possible to tho modifications in tho general troaty which have boon suggested in this lottar
including tho prohibition ugainst repairing tho fortifications.
22. With regard to tho establishment itsolf tho Governor in Council is of opinion that it
will porhnps ho expedient in the aotual state of affairs to frame it on a soale somewhat more
oxtonsivc than was originally conteinplaiod, so na to enable it to send out numerous anusd
vessols with strong parties oL eopoys to aot agiinst piratical vessels as well to render it capable
of making occasional descents on any parts ot tho coasts that may bo disposed to reeur to
piracy ; with this viow tho Governor in Council lias callod on tho Superintendent of Marine to
state tho number and tho naturo of tho vessels ho conceives necessary for this purpose, on which
subject also ho could bo gratified by a communication of your sentiments and those of
Captain Collier.
23. Ho id also pleased to authorise you lo leave such a force as you think necessary for
the abovo purposes (oveu if it should oxcerd tho strength originally prescribed of ono battalion),
nnd ho directs mo to suggest, for your consideration, whether tho advantage that would result
from attaching two or ra<>ro companies of Europeans to the detachment to be left in the Gulph
would be sufficient to compensate for the difficulty of supplying them and tho expeaso they
would occasion.
< 24., Tho arrangements now alluded to, with tho improssion left by the distinguished
ability and suocCEs of your military op:rafions, will, tho Governor in Counoil is confidont,
afford the strongest ground for relying on tho attainment of tho objects contemplated by
Government in tho suppression of piruoy aud the restoration of the commerce nnd tranquillity
of the Persian and Arabian shores.
233. The following reply of Major-General Sir W. G. Koir (dated the
11th April 1820) explains his viow of tho points at issuo: —
I have tho honor to acknowlodgo tho roceipt in Bombay on the 4lh iustant of your
despatches dated tho 16th of February.
(2) The vory liberal and gratifying manner which has boon adopted in expressing the
opinion of tho Governor iu Council on the subjects
Volume 31-17 of 1820-1826.
discussed in my despatch of the 10th January,
renders me doubly anxious to offer every elucidation of tho lino of policy which I pursued
when entering into engagements with tho Arab tribes in the Gulf of Persia.
(3) The leading idea under which I acted in framing both the General and Preliminary
Treaties, was found on the knowledge that our future relations with the Gulf of Persia were
to be supported by the presence of an efficient military force, calculated to act in a prompt
and vigorous manner on the first manifestation of any attempt lo return to piratical practices.
(4) The next prominent feature in the policy l pursued rested on a distinct understanding
that Government wished to abstain as much as possible, consistent with the attainment of the
desired object, from interfering with the affairs of the Arabian Continent.
(5) In theso two ideas the polioy I pursued had its origin, and I oudeavourod to maintaiu
it as consistently a9 possible. Whilst I shall ever regret that some of tho details of its
execution have not mot with approbation of tho Governor in Council, I feel highly gratified
at his most handsome recognition of the motives which induced me to iucur a responsibility
that a sense of duty called upon me to oncouutor.
(6) I have already expressed belief that long oonlirmed habits of cruelty and depredation
cannot bo eradicated by a slugle offort of power nor have ray expectations ever been so
sanguine as to induoo me to think that piraoy in the Gulf of Persia could bo perma­
nently suppressed without a watehful care t> destroy the first symptoms of any return
to it. I contemplated that the power of doing this was to remaiu with the British authorities
in tho Gulf, the Governor in Council will therefore peroeive that I was not influenced by any
abstract or theoretical belief iu the faith of treuties, or of promises to attain from praotioes,
recommended by habit, interest, aud religion, and that I was not by any means disposed to
trust the Arabs beyond where there could bo an aflioient oontrol over them. Whilst I
conceived that any measure calculated to secure their reform must have its foundation in power,
I reckoned it legitimate and good policy to betray as little as possible to them this distrust in
their faith, I therefore suppressed all outward signs of disbelief, nor did l think that our
actual strength could be diminished, or that any substantial benefit could be lost by my doing
so.
(7) To maintain the suppression of plunder and piracy has been throughout our avowed
deterraiuatiou, and this is perfectly understood iu tho Gulf, nor does thoro appear to me any­
thing in the treaties which have beeu made that would 6ubjoot Government to au allegation
of breach of faith, or uuduo interference, were it to mako uso of its power, in saying to ono
Chief wo shall not admit of any vessels equipped offensively for war, leaviug your ports ; or
to another wo forbid you to ooustruct any fortification excepting such as may be absolutely
necessary for your promotion agaiust your neighbours. In saymg this, we should of course
proceed to support our remonstrances if they were not attended to j nothing moro oould have
been done, had articles to this effcot beeu inserted in the tre-ities, nor would our intention of