Page 181 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

Part V-Chap. XXXVI. 159
87. It is therefore of importance both for tho interest of Ilis Highness himself, and
for tho safety of the Gulf, that ho should, if possible, a friend with thin Chief, but such arc tho
offccts of au ancient feud, inflamed by more recent personal animosities, on both sides that it
is not to bo expooted they will refrain from hostilities; and I fear His Highness was inclined to
foment dissension amongst the tribo* against the Sultan.
88. Sheikh Rashid bin Humid of Ejmnn is, as noticed in tho 8th paragraph of this
letter, at war with Sultan bin Suggur. Tho ostensible cause is a quarrel between two branches
of Beni Kara triho, ono of whioli is subject to Itushid bin Humid, and tho other disputes
his authority, and is supported by Sultan bin Suggur and the Jawa6mis; while tho Imaum
assists llashid. I suspect however that tho real cause is that Rashid, who was a notorious
pirate, and the friend of Hama bin Jabir, after acknowledging tho supremacy of Sultan bin
Smggur, has lately disclaimed it; and is cither encouraged, or was origiually instigated, by
the Imaum of Muscat.
89. Sultan bin Suirgur is, as I have beforo observed, recognized as the superior from
Ramas to Sharga oxcepdng at 15jman. This supremacy is of a very indefinite description and
is in fact little more than nominal, since Sultan bin Suggur has certainly very little direct
authority over them, and is unablo to control their actions; indeed I doubt if tho power of any
Sheikh was absolute even in his own tribe. The Chiefs arc elected by their own tribes, but
Sultan bin Suggur seoms to have Borne power in influencing their choice, although he could
not impose a Sheikh upon them against their will; they seem in fact to bo independent in
respect to their own tubes, but acknowledge a general allegiance to Sultan as the head of a
superior tribe. They all declared themselves responsible to us for the observance of the treaty
in 60 far os regarded their own ports, and yet on the paper which I have submitted, they
acknowledge an entire depcndeuco on Sultan bin Suggur, who has accordingly been in the
habit of procuring all their passes, and in fact of transacting everything for them with
Colonel Konnett. 1 cannot doubt the authority of this document because I compared tho
eeal with tliopo affixed to Sir William Kcir treaty; but it seemed to be of little avail, since one
of the Chiefs bad already denied it, and the rest seem to be cnly even nominally bound to
it; and I never even heard of its existence until I reached Sharga.
40. Sultan bin Suggur is ambitious of reducing tho tribes to complete and absolute sub­
jection and to be considered answerable for the whole of the coast. It is impossible for us to
recognize his authority any furthorthan it is obeyed by the other Chiefs, nor can we lend the
influence of our name in any way to aid his views; at the fame time we cannot directly interfere
to prevent liim from recovering that authority which he considers his birthright.
41. Although l apprehend much danger to the peace of the Gulf from the effects of
Sultan’s ambition, yet if his power were firmly established. I don’t think it would be a matter
of regret to us; «-ince if be were well disposed, be would prevent the rest from molesting us,
and if not, it were better to have ono head to look to than a number of independent pirates to
contend with ; his supremacy would prevent hostilities amongst the dependent tribes, who would
otherwise be quarrelling and committing piracies among themselves; and supposing the worst
possible case, that bo employed tho whole power of the coast in piracy, the evil would bo still
not greater than the individual piracy of each Chief; and tho remedy would be easier, 6iuce
this very power would make him more tangible, give him more to lose, and therefore more to
dread from our vougeance; whilst it would enable us more easily, by the punishment of the
head, to reduce the members to subjection. In the opposite case the advantages of his power
are magnified.
42. I do not think that tho Sultan is worse than any of the rest of tho Chiefs; as is at
all events not worse disposed to us; and I am not without hopes that he may yet by his future
conduct prove himself worthy of a better character than he has hitherto borne ; but 1 cannot
regard him without considerable anxiety when thinking of the effects which may result from
his abilities, his power and ambition.
48. I am at a loss what to suggest in respect to his request to be allowed to erect lines
towards the land; it would be certainly better than ho should not, but at the same time the
reasons he pleads are specious and natural, and I am not certain that the work he proposes
would at all strengthen tho place, or protect its shipping, against the attacks from the 6ea
which is the quarter from which operations ought to be carried on; a wall on the land eide only,
open to the town, and so constructed as not to defend by its flanks the approach by the creek,
or a long shore, would bo much less mischievous than tho strong houses of tho Sheikh.
44. Sultan bin Suggur possosse* a great many fine vessels, probably at least thirty, capable
of containing from fifty to one hundred men. Ho is building a largo bughla of about 120 tons.
f«>r the purpose, it is 6aid, of trading to India. Tho other Chiefs have very few boats, beyond
those employed for fishing, probably none of them has more than three or four. I shall how-
evor reserve a more particular account of the naval strength of the Jawassimis, until I shall
have received tho Registers from tho senior officer of tho Marine. I may however remark
that Sultan bio Suggur must, I think, have contrived to sverete almost all his boats at tho
time of the last expedition, since it is scarcely possiblo that so many large vessels could have
been built by him in so short a time as three years.
46. The next in importance i6 tho Chief of Abuthabi, Sheikh Tahnun. This person
appears to be tho principal Chief of the Beniya*
Chief of Abuthabi.
tribe, and tho Chief of Duby is subordinate to
!
'
!