Page 225 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

Part VI—Cliap. XLIV.] 203
him strongly to remonstrate with the Egyptian Commnndor against porsover-
ing in his designs on Bahrein, and explicitly inform him that his proceedings
wore in direct opposition to the understanding oxisting between his master
and tho Government of England; and that his not attending to our remon­
strance would probably lead to an interruption of tho amity now existing
between tho two States. Tho Resident was asked at tho same time to point out
to tho authorities at Maskat that it was not for their interests that tho Pasha
of Egypt should extend his conquests in the Gulf and that Government
confidently expected they would not in any way favour his dosigns, but on the
contrary act in unition with tho wishes of the British Government.
377. In his lottor No. 42, dated 7tli May 1839, tho Resident (Major
Honnell) submitted his report about the
Volurao 65—1001 of 1839, p. 37.
disposition, the strength and relative
interests of tho contending parties in tho Gulf with the establishment of the
Egyptian power in Arabia.
378. It was found at tho time Khorsid Pasha, the Egyptian Commander,
Abdullah bin Ahmed, tho Sheikh of Bahrein, and Esa-bon-Tarif, the Head of
tho Al-i-Ally tribe, were tho only parties who could strictly speaking bo said
* Sheikh Jabor of Koweit. to be in hostile relations with each other.
Sheikh Hulufa of Aboothabe. The list,* however, of those whoso
Sheikh Muktoom of Debaj.
Shoikh Saltan-bon-Suggur of Ras-el'Khyma interests were more or less affocted by the
end Shargah. advance of tho forces of Mahomed Ali
Sheikh Hameed*bon-Ra8hod of Ejman. in this direction, included all the Maritime
Shoikh Abdoollah-bon-Kashed of Amulgavine.
Said Harnud bon Aun of Sohar. Arabs from the mouth of the Euphrates
His Highness the Imam of Maskat. to Ras-cl-Hud, as detailed in the margin.
379. Tho strength of Khorshid Pasha lay in his artillery and regular
troops, the exact number of which it
Khorshid Pasha.
was difficult to ascertain. It was,
however, thought that, including his cavalry and irregular Mughrubbee
infantry, he had not above 3,500 available, unless indeed he had received the
reinforcements of 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot expected by him from Medinah.
Erom the coast, which was already in his possession, and tho Beduins under
his authority, ho could probably collect from 4 to 5,000 men, but upon these
little dependence could bo placed in the event of his experiencing anything
approaching to a reverse.
380. The means of resistance possessed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed
were such as to afford a prospect of suc­
Abdallah bin Ahmed.
cess if fairly brought into play. His
insular position, and the great superiority of his naval force, of course were
very much in his favor. His war boats, which were numerous, were of the
first description of that class of vessels. His subjects were brave and deter­
mined, and were moreover equally accustomed to serve at sea as well as on
shore. Of these, on the two Islands of Monama and Muharag alone, perhaps
not less than six thousand armed men, prepared to support their Chief to the last
extremity could be collected without difficulty, while half as many more
might be brought over in case of emergency from the TJttubi possessions
on the main land. The population of Bahrein could furnish a much larger
number of men capable of bearing arms than that above specified, but not
including the aboriginal or Shia inhabitants, who were an unwarlike raoe, but
who, smarting under the oppressive conduct of their TJttubi masters, would
gladly see the downfall of that tribe, and the establishment of any other power
in its room. Could Khorshid Pasha once gain a footing on the Island of
Monama with his guns and stores, and at the same time keep open his
communications with Ojcir and Katif, it was prooable that the unregulated
bravery of the Uttubis would eventually suocumb to the powerful effects
of the disciplined troops and artillery of the Egyptian Commander, but as
long as the Bahrein Chief maintained his -naval superiority, the enterprise
would be one of so much risk, as to render it doubtful whether it will ever be
attempted by the Pasha unless supported by the ships of the Viceroy, or those
of His Highness the Imam. The arrival of the former had been long looked for
in the Gulf, but it was possible that the earnest remonstrances of the British
Government might have induced Mahomed Ali to suspend his intentions
2 D