Page 222 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

200 Part Vl-Chap. XLIII.
Such a precodent has not up to the present date occurred, and permission * h
other hand, over been denied to any chief, a party to the truce, incited bv nvanVn - i °n
of booty, nnd desiring without just cause to mix himself up in the nuarrnlis ««« a prospoct
eubioribrrs to the truce, in the rosult of which ho has no immediate interest or * °lher8’ nofc
the grounds that if panted it would afford a plea to those bound, equally with 51°®if* °n
to wngo war at soa, whereon to base a similar right to espouse the causo of tho odd t j’ "ot
whom ha proposes to ally himself, and thus cause in the first instance un i»di»»!f i ..
the restrictive lino and Maritime Truce, whoso obligations would bo vorv °
forgotten and set asido by tho allies therasclvos on cither sido nocessarily bccnmin<* nnci I *
Piracies aro now of raro occurrence in theso seas. Slight cases of amwesaii.n” „ *!nPaj8\
with bloodshed, have almost annually occurred, and must over be exnectrd
occur, upon tho pearl hanks.
1 cclcU oc<*s‘onally t0
Their origin is almost invariably to bo traced to tho practice of debtors avoid.'™ *i
settlement of claims against them, on account of advances of money (for tho , lUe
oro visions during tho unemployed portion of the year, considered as a remuneration °f
hand for services to be hereafter rendered on tho ]>carl banks), by deserting their o\* ,°r^"
and taking refuge with another; and tho subsequent attempts of their lawful head or nffl •
creditors, forcibly to recover possession of their persons, or of the amount due bv thothClr
its equivalent from the boat in which thoy sail, belonging to tho tribe they mav havo ’ ' ?P
For such aggressions and irregularities at sea, it is incumbent upon tho British
.*
the terms aud spirit of the Maritime Truce, to exact redress. Bcsidcut, by
Attempts have been made to induce tho soveral chiefs to enter into a mutual am-
among themselves, without British guarantee, t> refuse refuge to such fugitives • ImtfK
have ever beon rendered nugatory by Arab pride and souse of honour, a. the project of the
advantage which e»oh chief (forming his own, and thercfo.e of course the moat
estimate of tho popularity and attractiveness of his particular Government and terrlf
whether on tho grounds of leniency and indulgence in the exaction of more moderate
superior military prowess and renown, or greater commercial advantages) anticipates f *
merical increase to his subjects, aud consequent improved revenue and influence.1 “ a
nu
. , T!>0 fir‘t Princ,'t,]e. ot ouf ipolioy enjoinhis: for obvious reasons, a total non-interfcrcnce
.n local mai ten concernm* only thMDMlvM, and the false position in which tho assumption
of the right of .ansting upon every fugitive being given up to hi. own chief would evZulv
place u>, a. being calculated to remove the only check at prceent existing to the tyranny and
^tiSte tei^f ^
oppreanou of tho chief over hie subjects con.l.tute powerful arguments against »ffordih<. the
‘ bW “ ‘h° r°0t °£ U‘° <=-1. '-ever muclit
The piratical Arab Chiefs, satisfied of the advantages obtained bv tho estahli.hmn i t
the Maritime Tmco which, by common consent, precluding hostilities with each othwSS^
tho chance of a relapse .ntoa.ystem of general depredations, and unprovoked a Session,
are now quite a. much interested in its maintenance as ourselves , and of this they exhS
ample proof in their united readiness to renew it for so long a period as ten years! or even
mare, had such been desired or deemed expedient. As before observed, however it u
too much to supposo that so radical a change has been or will for a length of time to 1, h!
effect*! as to admit of the total withdrawal of that influence and political control which htve
from their wise and imId exercise, rendered this Gulf, whose coasts are inhabited by a hmvn
rapacious, and cruel people brought up and nurtured from their childhood anrongKen" rf
bloodshed, and licentious and treacherous warfare on land, comparatively as safe and wen
world* *"** and “aT'8a '°n ot vcsse,B of nil natrons, as the seas of any other portion ofrirc

• Two examples may bere bo cited. In the middlo of the year 1835, when tho Shaikh of Amulgavino
expressed hia wish to asiiat tho peopl* of Charalc, it was assumed os a point with him, that whatever claims of
superiority he might formerly have possexsed over the Charak people, now they had looiitcd themselves in Persia
they had become Persian subjects, and cooseqoently he could not, situated as ho was, bavo any right to interfere
actively in their quarrels. And again, in October 1843, wheu three of the bhaikhs of tho Coast of Oman (Sultan
bin Suggur, Suggur bin 8ultao, and Muktoom bin Bntvo) applied for permission to afford aid to the ex-Chief
Abdoolla bio Ahmed of Bahrein, in regaining his lost authority over thai island, it was well known at tho time
that overtures bad been made by the latter's opponents, Mahoraod bin Khulecfa and hia colleagues, to tho fcbaikhs
of Aboothabee (Khaleefe bin Shakboot) and Amulgavine !Abdoolla bin Rashid), and that these chiefs were pre­
pared to join them. A positive refusal was therefore imperatively called for, and waa made in the following
terms to the ex-chief through whom the spplication had been made:—" It is not bidden from you Ibot Mahomed
bin Khsleefa, Esai bin Tarif, and their colleagues, being heads of tribes inhabiting Bahrein, tho British Govern­
ment oould not Interfere iotheir quarrel with you ; but Sultan bin Snggur and tho othor chiefs mentioned have
no connection or interest in the war, and you are aware that if they become your active allies, Mahomed bin
Kbaleefa and Esai bin Tarif would undoubtedly immediately crave tho aaitiatauco of Khsleefa bin Shakboot and
other chiefs. The result would be confusion throughout the Gulf, and enmity between all the tribes; moreover
no benefit would accrue to yourself.
“ For these reasons, it is not possible that I should grant my concurrence to tho interference in any way of
the cniefs of the Co.st of Oman, wlio are intimately connected with the British Government by agiceuients,.
and a truce among themselves made its guarantae."
It may be here remarked that in (he latter case tho applicants, although considering themselves in honour
bound to evince at least the pretence of exertion in favour of their ancient friend and ally, yet experienced
great satisfaction at having it in their power to adduce the unanswerable argument of the restraining power
of the British _ Government, contrary to whose wishes they wore not prepared to act. It moat bo remembered
too, sod to this they were fully alive, that by assisting the ex*ohief they would have given umbrage to the
Wababee ruler. Ameer Fjzul, the powerful ally of his opponent, and that, mcroover, they had everything to
lose and nothing to gain by engaging iu a profitless warfare, to tho prejudice of thoir trade, and the interrup­
tion of the pearl fishery.