Page 221 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

Part Vl-Chap. XLIII. 199

by sea. This answer wn6 received ns satisfactory, but were the Engagement
in question established for an unlimited or any long timo, the toolings of
disgraco and anger at having no prospect open for revenging tho insults they
had sustained, would rankle in tho minds of the Joasmi Chief and his follow­
ers, and would probably in tho end lead to an explosion, which might inflict
a serious and lasting injury upon tho peaceful policy which has hitherto been
so successful.
3G3. Tho Bombay Government thought somo woight should be attached
to these reasons urged by Captain Hontiell for a short in proferonco to an ex­
tended Maritime Truce. They therefore deemed it proper to ve9t Captain
Hennell with a discretionary authority to act as his local knowledge and
cxperieuoo might induce him to consider most expedient and best calculated
to ensure tho object Government had in view, namely, the preservation of
tranquillity in the Gulf. The Government of India concurred in their views
(Government of India’s letter to the Government of Bengal, dated 17th
January 1842).
364. In 1843, it became necessary to address strong and threatening
language to the Sheikh of Amulgavine, in order to induce him to fulfil the
agreement which had been entered into between himself and Sultan bin Saggar
at the interposition and mediation of the British Resident in 1840, and make
the a amendi by the destruction of certain fortified works whioh he had by its
terms been precluded from adding to or erecting. One inducement to this chief
to concede to this just demand, and to his opponent to acquiesce,—the total
removal of the obligations of the treaty thenceforward from all parties,—
appeared to exhibit itself in carrying into effect the Government suggestion of
lengthening the term of the truce, inasmuch as it obviated, at least during the
period thus extended, the necessity he (Chief of Amulgavine) at the time urged,
for the erection of any sea defences, and all parties consenting (the continuation
of the annual gifts being secured to them), a Maritime Truce of ten yearn was
accordingly, under the special authority of Government, entered into on the 1st
June 1843.
365. Writing in 1S44, Lieutenant A. B. Kemball, Assistant Resident in
the Persian Gulf, observed:—
These various restraints and checks to irregularities cannot be sufficiently appreciated
although the system may at first eight be viewed ns exercising too great and arbitrary an
influence and control over positively independent States. Thus precluded from the illicit
profits to be derived from piratical depredations at 6ea, it became a matter of vital importance
to secure to all the tribes, iu common, peace and tranquillity, while engaged in the practice of
their vocation on the pearl banks, and the prosecution of their carrying trade, the only means
which (the barrenness and infertility of the soil of their country, producing not sufficient for
the maintenance of the inhabitants, being called to mind) nature has placed within their reach
for gaining a livelihood, aud upon the success of which must depend the extent of commerce
and degree of prosperity and happiness among them. The interest, moreover, of humanity and
good policy dictate the prevention of outrage and aggression on these seas, by every precau­
tionary measure, rather than the punishment and coercion of such when perpetrated by the
rude and uncivilized tribes in these quarters.
By submitting to the Maritime Truce, the parties have hound themselves not to engage
in hostility s on the sea under any circumstanci s. On the occurrence of disputes of such a
nature as not to be amicably arranged by mediation and mutual concession, but to render neces­
sary a recourse to arms, the struggle must be held on land ; but should these disputes have had
their origin in depredations and unprovoked aggressions by sea, and at sea, then the aggrieved
chief is entitled to demand redress at the hands of the third party, or guarantee for the mainte­
nance of the conditions of the truce inviolate; and these conditions are, with tfce perfect
knowledge of all, only held to apply to aggressions on the sea by one boat upon another and
not to thoso cases where boats, drawing up on shore in the creeks and backwaters, are attacked
and robbed by the Bedouins. The interference of the Resident towards redress in such cannot
be claimed. Circumstances may possibly arise calling for the temporary suspension of the
operation of the restrictive line, and this contingency forms the nly objection tc imposing any
restraint of this nature on the Arabs with whom we have treaties, arising out of the impossi­
bility of exerting a similar control over other States not so bound, the settlement of whose
disputes with tho former would be involved in intricacy and difficulty.
In cases whore lawless and unprovoked aggressions have been made at sea by such a power
not authorised by open war, and the remonstrances and mediatory interposition of the British
authority have failed to procure redress for the injured aud aggravated chief, justice and good
policy would demand that the latter should be permitted to have recourse to his own means to
exact it; aud further, that the British authorities, having exerted their influence without effect
to bring his opponent to a proper sense of his injustice, should restrain any of the other chiefs
subscribers to tho truce, from interfering in any way, but certainly from affording his assist­
ance to that opponent.