Page 218 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

196 Part VI—Chap. XLIII.

our prosent nltcrcd and neutral policy, as connected with the affairs of Muscat moro especially
I havo to hopo that tho arrangement proposed in thoilnd paragraph of my letter to Commodore
Popper will moot with tho sauetion of tho Right Hon'blo the Governor in Council, not only
as guarding against the long established predatory spirit of tho Joasincc tribo, upon tho most
exposed point of tho Ciulf, but as at least affording a negativo protection to our ancient ally
tho Imam, against any suddon act of aggression by sea, on tho part of Sultan Bin Suggur. 7
6th.— Tho only Chief absolutely requiring an establishment of war-vessels is tho Sheik of
Bahrein, whoso independence, from his vicinity to tho Wahabco powor, to which ho has been
long opposed, must in a great measure hingo upon his superiority at sea, but tho cruieinir
of his armed boats could easily bo confined within tho limits of the isolated part of tho Gulf in
which his principal territory is situated; though this ohief is too tangible, and too well
convinced how dcoply his interests would bo affectod by any collision with British authority
and influence in this quarter, t> render it probable 1m will risk auy deviation from that com-
mondablo and peaceable lino of conduct, which havo lately distinguished him, at least in as far
as his general maritiuio pursuits have been concerned.
7th.—Advorting to tho still more limitod restriction imposed upon tho armed boats of
tho Boniyas Chief of Aboothabec, I have to explain that in the present divided and unsettled
state of tho tribe, and with advertence to their late excesses, it appeared extremely desirabls
that their oxonrsions into the opou sea should at least for a timo bo confined to the narrowest
bounds ; moro especially, as it was only a few days before ray arrival upon tho opposito coast
that tho Slmik's brothers " Snltan ben Shakboot " (s-> deeply implicated in the lato piracies)
prococdcd down tho Gulf towards Muscat, with three vessels, said to contain a great number
of armed followers : to the annoyance and dismay of the people on both sides the Gulf, who are
eithor at feud with tho tribo to which he belongs, or havo reason from past experience to
dread such a force being abroad in these seas. I trust therefore the precaution now adopted
to confine the offensive means of this restless and daring race to their own immediate coast*
will be honored with the further approval of Government.
3‘19. These arrangements were sanctioned by the Bombay Government in
their letter No. 763, dated 30th April 1836.
350. Having concluded his arrangements on the Arabian Coast, Major
Morison on the 19th January 1836 addressed a letter to Commodore Popper,
requesting him to issue instructions to the naval force in the Gulf to carry
them into effect. In consequence of some irregular proceedings on the
part of the relations of Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed, the restrictive line was
subsequently made applicable to JBowillah and Bahrein, by being extended
from Eaxolul, ten miles north of Has Rucan, through tho Island of Kraing, to
Raszur on the main, a measure which was assented to by the Uttuhi Chief,
in a letter dat»*d the 26th March 1836, and which as far as related to the
vessels from Howillah, received the sanction of Government conveyed in their
communication No. 573 under date the 13th April of the same year.
351. Upon the whole, tho restrictive line, under its several modifications
as above detailed, and passing through a number of fixed points, was consider­
ed as sufficiently defined for oar objects. From tho preceding statement,
however, it will he observed, that although the concurrence of the Arabian
Chiefs in its establishment may be considered by implication to have been
afforded, yet that, with the exception of a letter from Sheikh Abdullah bin
Ahmed of Bahrein, we hold no written documents in which their consent ha9
been formally given. The absence of hostilities by sea for several years prevent­
ed any ocoasion for our vessels of war using coercivo measures for maintaining
the neutrality of the principal line of traffic in the Gulf, while the establishment
of a truce for the ensuing twelve months, the Resident hoped, would continue
to render their interference unnecessary. He, however, suggested in tho event
of the Arabian Chiefs applying for permission to declare war against each
other at any future period, that a written and formal recognition of the
restrictive line, and neutral ground, bo required from each Sheikh, preparatory
to the authority requested being afforded.
352. The Government of Bombay in their letter No. 1356, dated 11th July
1838, expressed approval of the last suggestion of the Resident.
353. Among the parties to this truce the Chief of Bahrein was not included.
He was too tangible and too well convinced how deeply his interest would be
affected by any collision with British authority and influence in this quarter
to render it probable that he would risk any deviation from that commendable
and peaceable line of conduct which had previously distinguished him, at least
as far as his general maritime pursuits had been concerned. Independently