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210              [Part VI—Chap. XLIV.
                         of thoso despatches a* his oxp«rioncc might suggest, and Iiis Lordship would have boon happy
                         to avail himsrlf of thorn in forming his own judgment. But as I have not hoard from you
                        again on tho subject, and as these napors relato to matters of importanco on which it is
                        dosirablo that some resolution should be formed without delay, I am directed to communicate
                        to yon, for tho information of His Honour in Council, tho following remarks of tho Governor-
                        Geucral on Captain Ilonnoll's despatches.
                            8. H's Lordship hiirhly applauds tho zeal and onorgy which induced Captain Ilcnnell to
                          Captnin Ucnnoll’a letter A, datol 4th July 1830, undertako his Into voyage along tho coast, in
                        with cocImukm.               order to ascertain fully tho metivos which had
                        induced tho Chief of Bahrein and others to submit, without apparent necessity, to Kboorsia
                        Pacha, the Egyptian Gcnoiol, and to endeavour by his presence and personal influence and
                        exhortation to 6top tho progross of submission on tho part of tho Maritime Chiefs which might
                        otherwise, he had reason to apprehend, extend ovor tho pwvinco of Oman.
                           4. The explanation afforded by Shoik Abdoola biu Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, either
                        in his letter to Captain Ilcnnell, or in his conversation with that officer, of tho motives which
                        had induced him so unexpectedly and apparently 60 unnecessarily to place his territories in a
                         position of dependence on Egypt, and to become himself tributary to Muhammad Ally,
                        appoarB to tho Governor-General most unsatisfactory. The facility of crossing from tho main­
                        land to Bahrein in boats, which he alleges as the cause of his weakness and inability to
                        opposo tho Egyptian General, might have boon a valid reason for submission to an army
                        assembled on the coa^t, and furnished with boats to effect the passage. But no such
                        imminent danger threatened him, nnd much time must have been occupied in preparations
                        for the invasion of Bahrein. Jar from waiting for these, the Sheik appears, on the arrival
                        of nn Agent of Khoorshed Pasha, to have surrendered his independence at the first summons,
                        and oven now to discuss « ith complacency the propriety of his conduct. From the date of
                        the engagement entered into with Khoorshed Pasha, it appears that it was negotiated
                        subsequently to tho visit of Admiral Maitland and Mr. Edmunds to Bahrein, and the Sheik's
                        assertion that the engagement was concluded before the arrival of the Wellesley at Bahrein
                        can deserve little credit, as such a transaction could hardly have escaped the knowledge o£
                        Mr. Edmunds, if in reality the island of Bahreiu had become a dependency of Egypt before
                        his visit. It must therefore bo ursumed that Sheik Abdoolah consented to become tributary
                        to the ruler of Egypt, not only before he was (compelled by any military demonstration to
                        adopt that course, but after all the encouragement to resistance and promise of support whioh
                        he  bad received from tho British Government, and it would thence appear manifest that, by
                        whatever motives he may have been influenced, he has deliberately preferred his present
                        connexion with Egypt to his former independence in alliance with the British Government.
                           b. Sheik Abdoola’s conduct is unfortunately not a solitary instance of too ready
                        submission to the demands of Khoorsbid Pasha and hi6 Agent Syud bin Mootluk. There is
                        reason to believe that Sheik Kuleefa bin Shakboot and Sooltan bin Suggur bad rather
                        encouraged than otherwise the pretensions of Syud bin Mootluk and but for the npp-arance of
                        the Resident on the coast of Oman, it i6 to be apprehended that the other Chieftains in that
                       quarter would ere long have been induced or compelled to submit to tho authority of the
                       Officer appointed by Khoorsbid Pasha to rule over them.
                           6.  Under sach circumstances it could have only been by energetic measures such as
                       those adopted by Captain Hennell, that the continued influeneo of the British Government
                       over these petty States could have been longer maintained.
                           7.  The Governor-General it therefore prepared to approve and -confirm the engagements
                            -
                       entered tnfo by that officer for the supply of munition* of tear to certain of the Chieftains,
                       and. Hit Lordship hopes that the engagements concluded by several of the chief's io adhere to
                       their former connexion, and not to permit Syud bin Mootluk to obtain a footing among them,
                       ■will be faithfully performed.
                          8.  Of this there might not have been much prospect if Khoorsbid Pasha and his Agent,
                           bin Mootluk, Were to persist in prosecuting their deigns against the independence
                       of the‘Chiefs of Oman, for it has been seen with Row little regard to honor and good faith
                       several of these Chieftains who had engaged to Lieutonaut Edmunds to oppose with one
                       accord the encroachment! of Syud bia Mootluk were almost immediately afterwards in
                       friendly communication with that officer, and were preparing the way for the general
                       subjugation of their own, and of all the surrounding territories.
                          9.  Any dependence on the steadiness of these .Chieftains to ‘the engagements they have
                       subscribed being therefore limited to tho inducements which they may have to keep them,
                       and as Captain Hennell had so little reason to rely on their good faith after he had left the
                       coast, he appears to have acted ‘with a sound discretion in resorting to other means of
                       deterring Syud bin Mootluk from his projected subjugation of Oman. The Governor-General
                       approves the tenor of tho Resident's letter to that officer, and trusts that the remonstrance
                       may not only produce an effect upon his proceedings, but may tend aB'iiiuch-as their engage­
                       ments to Captaiu Hennell to unite the Arab Chiefiain in the defoncee of their independence.
                          10.  Captain Hennell's previous remonstrance to Khoorsbid Pasha appears not t  to have
                       been without effect, and his protest against the encroachments of tne Egyptian  forces
                       in the direction of Oman, will, it is to be hoped, lead to the immediate recall of Syud bin
                       Mootluk from that province.
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