Page 248 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

220 [Part VI—Chap. XI.IV.

CHAPTER XLV.

REVERSAL OF THE RECENT BRITISH POLICY OF PRO-
TECTING INTERNAL TRIBES OF ORAN, 1812.
408. With his letter dated 30th November 1841, Captain ITcnnoll for­
warded translation of a communication from the Nativo Agent as ShargaU
regarding the projected expedition of Amir Khalcd against Brymi and
expressing his opinion that little, if any, reliance could bo placed on
the Chiefs of Oman offering an effectual or even a real resistance to Amir
Khalod’s force should it advance into that province. Captain Ilennell
stated that he was of opinion that in tho event of the Amir refusing
to change his intention of invading Oman that suoh of tho Chiefs as give
unequivocal proofs of maintaining their own independence, by actually
opposing Sued ben Mutluk’s advance, should bo supported by the British
Government by receiving moderate supplies of arms and ammunition. Cap­
tain Hennell at tho same time observod that it would be a point for tho
consideration of Government how far tho entire removal of our military
force from tho Persiau Gulf might be expedient, should the Nodgdis
enter Oman, and whether its temporary location at Bassadoro might not
bo advisable, until it bo seen what turn affairs were likely to take, both in
Arabia and Afghanistan.
409. If Amir Khaled could be dissuaded from his designs, the Governor
in Council was very doubtful how far it would be good policy to oppose
the Amir in tho manner suggested by Captain Hennell, but at all events
tho Bombay Government was decidedly averse to the location of the British
troops at Bassidore, or in any other place in the Gulf, and were of opinion
that on the evacuation of Karrak the troops’should bo withdrawn altogether
and the Government be content with maintaining its naval supremacy
(Bombay Government letter No. 1951, dated 31st December 1841).
410. The Government of India replied as follows in their lotter No. 47,
dated 17th January 1842:—
6. With reference to the Resident’s despatch No. 142- of tho 27th of November, I am
directed to observe that, although it was considered to be the policy of tho British Government
to exert an unusual degree of influence to counteract the efforts of the Pasha of Egypt and
his Generals to establish their authority as far southward as the province of Oman, and
Captain Hennell was in consequence authorized to encourage the Chiefs of Brymee and other
petty principalities to resist any attempts at their subjection, now that the ambitious designs
of the ruler of Egypt have been checked, it would be more prudent and more conformable
to our general news of policy in that quarter, to avoid mixing ourselves up with the contests
of the native powers, and far preferable that we should confine our interference to the
constant maintenance of our maritime supremacy over the tribes on the coast. For these
reasons, His Lordship in Council would have been satisfied to watch tho proceedings of
Ameer Khaled without atteraptiug to arrest them, unless they were directed against the
power aud privileges of any of the chieftains whom we are hound to protect. It is donbtfu),
according to the Resident's own opinion, whether the petty Chiefs of Oman feel enough of
interest in their own independence to defend themselves against the Ameer if he aotually
invades their territory, and if they are indifferent on the subject, it is not apparent to the
Governor-General in Council what political objeot is to be gained by our exoiting them
to resistance, while it is certain that the extension of our relations with the chief of the
interior will ere long prove troublesome if not embarrassing to us.
7. On these grounds His Lordship in Council doubts the expedienoy of Lieutenant
.lopp’s deputation to Ameer Khaled. and would wait the issue of that officer’s mission
before giving authority to assist the Chiefs of Oman, and for the future His Lordship in
Council would strongly impress on the Resideut the expedienoy of our confirming as much
as possible our political relations to the maritime Chiefs with whom we have so long
been intimately connected, and avoid, as far as possible, interfering in the politics of the
iuland States.
411. Deprived of the Egyptian aid, Khaled was quite unable to hold
his own in Nejd, and had soon lo make place for his cousin Abullah ben
Sun cyan.
412. The now ruler had been just a year installed in authority, when
Fey sal reappeared in Arabia having somehow effected an escape or a release