Page 252 - Records of Bahrain (7) (i)_Neat
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238                         Records of Bahrain

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                  ' CONFIDENTIAL-^’- '                   /
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              •••                              ■ :ii q.
              [Flag A]  .       it-'i'ln.jiia telogrnm^No. 218 of March 13, aont during vHill*•
               p/I./,/ztho rc9°nt disorders and/strikc in Bahrain, Sir B. ’ Burrows '
               rzmouy/r qskcd. whether, if the Bahrain Government were to paos all'
                         emergency:law making it illegal to fonion t a strike or conspiyy.fi’?;
                          to do so .oxcept where a trade dispute ia involved, we e|iould.j'vivi*-
                         bp rea^y to support the Bahrain Government-in acting againp£
                      v. .members.'of the "High Executive Committee" or othcra whg'Y-V "-
                     •. "^ntr«^pod.ou°h n law.
              [Flag B]  . r’V   2 f3 :.xAq will be seen from the minutes at EA 1016/31 , ,
                         this question-woo overtaken by events; while it was being        'V:
                          considered’ the Bahrain Government reached an accommodation
                    * 'with the reformists and the strike ended.                  ,:*  •
                                  •*.» .            ..                     : 4^’“ 'Vi.
              [Flag CJ. .      3.; ; :In his telegram No. 313, Sir B. Burrows now asks for-ft;;
                         guidance; on this matter as; there ia still a . possibility ..thatjX/l*
                          qtrike-.action may be renewed.              .        ;

                               4«-. The possible advantages of encouraging the.Ruler to/, vs);-;
                          enact a law of the kind proposed are :
                                                                                    • . * 4* i:-J’:
                                    (i) . that it would make clear to tho reformists
                                          that the Bahrain Government is determined       •*!.
                                                                             . .11
                                          to preserve order and that political .          r(."‘
                                          activity must be kept within proper
                                          constitutional bounds ;                  i
                                    (ii) it would enable the Ruler to act in proper
                                 ...
                                          legal form against the reformist lcadeys'-if
                                          their conduct merited it.                    ££$&
                                 :v -                                              ' • v’-V^vk
                               5« ■. On the other hand the following considerations! apply;};*.
                                                                               ... • l
                                 ;   (a) If disorder breaks out in Bahrain and reaches jrVSJ;
                                         proportions-beyond the power of the civil \ .Vrtfj
                                         police to control, British troops will have '
                                         to help restore law and order. Any attempt N/
                                         by the Bahrain Government to arrest the
                                         members of the Committee of National Union        . -i
                                          (as the High Executive Committee is now
                                         called) would almost certainly result in
                                         widespread disturbances and. the operation ■:      ,
                                         could not be carried out without the support
                                         of British troops.
                                    (b) VYe have to support the Ruler; but we do not.
                                  ;*     want him to..take any unnecessary action which'
                                         would increase tension or tend to drive ..the ''.'H
                                         reformists to extremes. The Ruler has now
                                         come to an-agreement with the reformist, party,
                                          negotiated through'our mediation, and- we want'.
                                         to give this a chance to work. •
                        r                                                  1
                                    (c) If the RulerAonacts a law along the lines'
                                          proposed, this will certainly boi regarded*by :'1
                                  V-the lenders of the Committee of National.' Unign.^pj!
                                   ?V-:'  . os a provocative act aimed direqtly at 'tlia.rnf.(‘.4;-:'jS
                      *.»
                      >..                .There* seems ytjius to be a risk that it would^r^n
                                         result in a .'.'show down" between the reformists
                           • V-
                            : .   . r. .-.and the Ruler. Demonstrationo and probably
                                         a strike (the.- two are scarcely di3tinguishab|Lp.^j
                                 • ih*             ■v"" ,
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