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and Mohammera ; the Arab ports on the opposite coast; and Bahrain in that triennial
period amounted to £17,9*11,300 (at the rate of Rs. I5 = £i). Of this total, local trade
accounted for 25,124,000, and external trade for £12,117,300; while of the latter total the
trade with British possessions (including India) amounted to £9709,500, or over 80 per
cent, of the entire external trade. In the same three years, out of a total of 2,161 steamers
which entered and cleared from the Gulf ports, 2,039 "ere British, and their tonnage repre
sented 84 per cent, of the total tonnage. If the returns of Persian ports alone be required,
the figures are total trade, £11,172,000, of which local trade £2,169,400 and external trade
£9,002,600, the British proportion of the latter being £7,494,200, or 83 per cent. To these
totals in cither ease there should, in our opinion, certainly be added those of Basra, which
amounted in the same triennial period to £2,157,300. Unfortunately the manner in which
these have been prepared, do not admit of our distinguishing the countries of origin or
destination. The proportion, however, that should properly be assigned to Anglo-Indian
commerce may be inferred from the British percentage of shipping, that entered or cleared
from that port in the three years referred to. It amounted to no less than 93 per cent, both
of the number and tonnage of the steamers engaged.
During the last thirty years the maintenance of the submarine cables of the Indo-
EuroperfB Telegraph Company from Fao to Jask, and of the land lines from that place to
Karachi, has also devolved upon the Indian Government, and has tended to incicase an
already preponderant influence over both the waters and the shores of this sea. Latterly
thore has been a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our influence in certain quarters
where trouble threatened or where rivalry >vas feared. At the north-west cxtiemiiy of the
Gulf, we have, under instructions from Her Majesty’s Government, entered into engage
ments with the still independent Sheikh of Koweit, by which lie has bound himself and his
successors not to receive the representative of any other Power and not to alienate any
portion of his territory to the Government or sub;ecta of any other Power—a proceeding
which was dieted by the increasing encroachment of Turkish authority and by theiucipien.
intrigues of other Powers. Similar machinations are known .to be in progress at Bahrein
and will require to be counteracted by a more strict enforcement of the condition to which
the Sheikh is by treaty bound. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included
within the sphere of its political influence; its trade is similarly in Anglo-Indian hands;
and its ruler has not merely for years been subsidised by the Government of India, but in
1891 entered into<an Agreement with us, under the orders of Her Majesty’s Government,
not to alienate any portion of his dominions to any other Power.
Such, briefly summarised, is the position that has been won by Great Britain, not without
the expenditure of many millions of money and the sacrifice of many valuable lives, in the
Persian Gulf. In its vindication we have more than once been called upon to enter military
occupation of ports or islands in the Gulf. The island of Kharak was occupied by Indian
forces from 1838 to 1842, and again in 1856-57. Bushire was held during the latter years
as also were Muhammara and Ahwaz upon the Karun. The occupation of these places
was an illustration of the vigour with which in past years our ascendancy has been main
tained. Their abandonment was a proof of the reluctance which has invariably been'dis
played to emphasise or to perpetuate these responsibilities. The latter, however, no less
than the British position in Southern Persia in general, are now threatened by aa external
competition, to the evidences of which we next turn.
138. The despatch detailted the vorious ways in which Russia, France and
Germany had been displaying an ever-increasing interest in the Persian Gulf and
Oman. It was shown how there was more than a mere coincidence in the simul
taneous movements in these regions.
139. Referring to Germany, it was explained that her interest has been the
historical, and perhaps the natural, sequel of a commercial policy that has for
some time aimed at securing the control of the principal railways in the Turkish
dominions in Asia Minor, and of a political ambition that more recently still,
would appear to aim at the protection of the Ottoman Empire, alike in Europe
and Asia. The obvious corollary to a system of German railways in Asia Minor
would be similar rail-roads to the Persian border and through Mesopotamia to the
Persian Gulf. Prolongation of the Turko-German railways to Baghdad and to
the Persiah Gulf had been and were still being freely discussed; and the German
Government were endeavouring to procure an interest in the overland Turkish
Telegraph Fao.
140. While the Government of India regarded these symptoms of increas
ing German interest in the Persian Gulf as emphasising the international aspect
which the Persian question appeared more and more destined to assume, and
therefore as adding to the complexities of an already sufficiently difficult situa
tion, they would not question the bond fide commercial enterprise which was
carrying German trade there, as to so many other open seas and ports in the
world, and it was conceivable that we might even find, in the existence of