Page 346 - Gulf Precis(VIII)_Neat

32
at Ispahan with subordinate Consuls and Vice-Consuls, and Native Agents at Karmanshah,
Shiraz Yezd or Kerman, and Bushirc, whilst the control of the Persian Gulf and Arab
Coast including Muscat should be placed under the Consul at Busrah. who should have a
Vice-Consul or Native Agent under him at Bushire, with Vice-Consuls at Bahrain and
Muscat. No reasons are given in Mr. Mackenzie's first letter for transferring the Persian
Gulf and Littoral and the Arab Coast and Muscat to the Consul at Busrah, but in a subse­
quent letter he explains that the questions arising on the Arab Coast appertaining almost
exclusively to Turkey would be more directly treated through the Busrah Consulate
and the Governor-General of that province. Is it intended that the Consul at Busrah should
also obtain the co-operation of the Turkish Naval Force in maintaining the maritime peace,
as the disappearance of the British Navy from the scene is recommended. The proposal
is based on an obviously erroneous assertion./ The suggestion of the withdrawal of our
Navy from the Gulf is supported by a reason, vis., that" formerly there were neither
.steamers nor telegraphs in the Gulf, now there are both," therefore, it is argued, the pre­
sence of our Navy is unnecessary. I cannot say that experience has warranted this con­
clusion, and the geneial proposition that, when there arc steamers and telegraphs, naval
force is unnecessary will scarcely command assent. The maintenance of the Persian Gulf
Residency is, l hold, a matter of some importance to India in a political sense apart from
commercial considerations. A position and prestige has been built up in that region which
should not lightly be abandoned. I recollect reading in a memorandnm written by Sir
Owen Burne on Lord Mayo's administration that our policy in the Gulf and its results
were subjects of unmixed satisfaction. It is certainly regarded by the peoples of those
parts as of importance, and by foreigners with some envy. Thousands of natives of India
pass up the Gulf yearly and carry back to thousands of homes in India their impressions of
the widespread power and influence of England. A withdrawal such as advocated by
Mr. Mackenzie would with reason be regarded as aa evidence of our decline and failing
strength.
1 have hitherto treated of the expediency or advisability of the suggestions, but l have
to add that I consider them in some ways impracticable. I do not think that the Foreign
Office would ever consent to put a rival authority to that of the Legation in Central Persia,
and even if they entertain the proposal,.I do not think the Persian Government would
easily agree to it. They would probably urge that such a startling change would lead to
Russia demanding corresponding privileges in Persia, and would certainly rouse attention
and activity in her diplomacy.
I had some suspicions when in the Gulf that Russia might develop shortly an interest
in the direction of Bunder Abbas. Neither the motives nor the signs were entirely
wanting. The effacement of our prestige in the Persian Gulf recommended by Mr. Mack­
enzie might be considered a favorable opportunity for other powers to replace us there,
and indeed I have no doubt his scheme, so far as the Gulf is concerned, would be heartily
applauded both by Russia and Turkey.
129-A. No action was taken on this correspondence.
130. In 1887-88 projects were under consideration for strengthening our
influence in Persia, especially by way of the Karun river. As to these schemes,
the Persian Arabistati Pricis will have to be read (see Chapters IV et seq.).