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sphere, and it would be manifestly difficult to arrive at an engagement that
no political influence should be exercised by either party on the opposite side of
the line, since it would be out of the question to remove the British representa­
tives, either at Tehran, Tabriz or Meshed, while corresponding objection
would no doubt be felt by the Russian Government. But even an engagement
limited to railway and commercial exploitation would have considerable
value. The following difficulties and drawbacks in the case of such an un­
derstanding were then discussed. The line proposed is not altogether assisted
by geographical conditions, Seistan being physically and administratively a
part of the province of Khorasan, and it is doubtful whether Russia would
forego her designs upon Seistan and a port on the eastern extremity of the
Persian Gulf. A more serious drawback, however, is the fact that the capital
of Persia would lie in the Russian sphere, and the pressure exercised by the
Russian Government would become overwhelming, the Shah would tend more
and more to become a Russian puppet, and Northern Persia a Russian procon­
sulate. The. fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of Persia and the
Indo-European Telegraph Department would be more than doubtful, the
weight and influence of Russia throughout Central Asia would be increased
and the ultimate result might be the permanent break-up of the Persian king­
dom. Nor would this policy prevent Russia from approaching the Persian
Gulf via Baghdad, or other countries from attempting to acquire the position
in Southern Persia from which Russia had debarred herself. But, while not
sanguine of success, the Government of Lord Curzon expressed themselves of
opinion that the experiment was worthy of being made, in the interest both of
Persia itself, and still more harmony between the two great Powers, upon
whose relations the peace of Asia depends. Such a contract, even if not of
perpetual duration, would be of immense value in the respite afforded from the
strain of an otherwise ceaseless rivalry and in the opportunity presented for a
peaceful consolidation of existing interests.
145. Should, however, the endeavour to arrive at an understanding, with
Russia fail, then it would still be possible to fall back upon the alternative policy
recommended by Sir M. Durand, which was that we should plainly intimate that
any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia will provoke corresponding
measures for the protection of British interests in the south.
146. The despatch then turned to the increase of the Consular establish­
ments in Persia and the principle on which the cost should be met by Great
Britain or India.
147. On examination of the cost of the various establishments maintained
by the British Government in Persia, it was shown that the Imperial Government
spent ^15,460 and the Government of India ^61,053 per annum, or, if Turkish
Arabia were included in the calculation, the totals amounted to Great Britain
£\5,597, India ^71,056, contributions which did not at all fairly represent the
respective proportions of Imperial and of Indian interests in Persia and its sur­
roundings. Two principles might with advantage be borne in mind in distri­
buting such charges between Great Britain and India, either that the entire
charges might be added together and might be divided in certain proportions
between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers, or that the spheres in Persia of
special concern either to Her Majesty’s Government or to the Government of
India might be determined, and the charges incurred’ for them debited against
the revenues respectively of the United Kingdom and of India. This was the
solution which the Government of India would prefer.
148. The real line of distinction, the despatch continued, should be that,
whereas the ' commercial interests of Her Majesty’s Indian subjects, outside of
India, are in the main the concern of the Imperial Government, yet in cases where
the political importance of a place or district exceeds the commercial, and where
that political importance is Indian rather than English in character, the Gov­
ernment of India may legitimately be called upon to defray sometimes a large
proportion, sometimes the whole of the cost. The despatch then proceeded to
apply these principles to a consideration of certain-suggestions of Sir M. Durand
and certain proposals of the Government of India concerning the increase of
Consular establishments in Persia. The changes and additions which have in
consequence been made during Lord Curzon’s Viceroyalty will be separately
mentioned below.*
* As regards Consular appointments and escorts see Pinion Coast and Islands Ptlcis, 1854*19051 Sections
XXX1U—XXXVIII. Bahrein Precis, Chapters LVlI—LXt. Arabistan Pricis, Chapter Vll,
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