Page 18 - Anglo Portuguese Rivalry in The Gulf_Neat

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retreat without shame, and it was more prudent to an unforeseen effect on the attitude of Simao de Mello,
make terms with the English than for so many soldiers • Captain of Ormuz, who wrote to the Governor of
barbarously to die in vain; as it is certain that ten ) India that the English having accomplished their
object and laden the silks, would return to Surat and
»1 soldiers are worth more to us, than ten thousand to the ■1
Shah, and even so, the affair was ended better than I leave Ormuz unmolested. He added that if they
I should come after all, he was confident that he could
V had expected . . . the Fortress [of Ormuz] is safe and I *
!• your Worship should send a good Captain for the fleet; prevent either Persians or English from setting foot in
»1 there is no need to worry about the possibility of the island.1 This arrogant boast was soon put to the
reca pturing Kishm, now or ever, because, so long as test, for on Saturday, February 19th, six English
we have control of the sea, they can never stop us vessels hove in sight accompanied by an enormous
flotilla of small .craft carrying some 3,000 Persian
watering in so large an island, whilst if we have not
Hi command of the sea, events have shown that the place soldiery, and the whole force anchored at a distance of
i1- about six miles from the Castle at sunset. Next day,
!;| will always be more of a hindrance than a help. And
even though your Worship should realise all these the Persians under the command of Imam Quli Khan
i\ landed without opposition, and marched with a great
f: things perfectly, yet I could not forbear informing show of resolution on the city. Simao de Mello, for
you that I was of your opinion, as I always have been
all his previous bragging and sneers at Ruy Freyre, had
in this matter ; and that the blame of everything lies
!• completely lost his head on the appearance of the
I on Ruy Freyre, who impoverished the state for. the
■!: glory of making a fortress, and who abandoned his Anglo-Persian armada and had made no attempt to
e! resist the disembarkation, as he might easily have done.1
armada for the sake of defending it. His Majesty
hi should trust more in us who are on the spot, and not A few men had been posted behind barricades erected
•i: so much in the ministers at Madrid, who cannot know in the Maidan or market square, “ but the Persians,
as much of these regions as we.”1 soone made way, and the Portugalls like so many sheepe
1 • A few days after the surrender of Kishm and the tooke their heels into their Castle.” Two valiant
joint occupation of its fortress by an Anglo-Persian captains, Dom Gon^alo da Silveira and Luis de Moura
•i. detachment, the English squadron sailed to Gombrun, Rolim, attempted to stay the panic, but their efforts
where the officers and men were royally feasted by the were without avail and in this manner the Persians
M occupied and sacked the city.
grateful Khan of Shiras, who was nevertheless chagrined
that the English would not surrender Ruy Freyre to
him. The withdrawal of the fleet to Gombrun had • 1Lcttcr of SimSQ de Mello for FemSo de Albuquerque, 7/11/1622 (Com#
se perdeu OrmuZj p. 199-200). Three of the English ships, including the
■ li Lion with Ruy Freyre on board, were sent back to Surat at this time, which
‘l! may have had the effect of confirming Sim2o de Mello in his erroneous
•M document printed on pp. 197-198 of Como se perdeu Ormuz. This opinion.
••f atatement supports the version narrated in the Commentaries, and provides
a satisfactory refutation of the hints thrown out by D. Garcia da Silva y .
* . Figeroa in his journal, that Ruy Freyre did not oppose the surrender of the *Sim2o de Mello’s own excuse for the lack of resistance offered, was that
i fort. Incidentally, the Archbishop’s letter affords yet another instance of the majority of the soldiers available were unarmed, having just come from
the continual ill-feeling between the Spaniards and Portuguese at this date, Kishm, where they had been deprived of their weapons by the English on
and the mutual suspicion with which they regarded each other. evacuating the fort.
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