Page 41 - Anglo Portuguese Rivalry in The Gulf_Neat

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was to be attacked. With the promulgation of this
order, Anglo-Portuguese rivalry in the Persian Gulf
became once and for all a thing of the past—at any
rate in so far as armed hostilities were concerned, and
even of purely commercial rivalry there was henceforth
, little or none, Whatever the reactions caused
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1 elsewhere, the signing of the definitive agreement at
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1 Goa on January 18th, 1635, brought nothing but
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• 'i good to both of the erstwhile enemies in the Gulf ; and
c v the signatories to that memorable document, had
.1 every reason to congratulate themselves on thus
fortunately terminating a situation which had become
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li •l, “ flat, stale and unprofitable ” to all concerned.
: galleons, in order to carry out the expedition to Kishm,
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!! 1
I The story of Anglo-Portuguese rivalry in the Persian
i now nothing to prevent the English from proceeding
Gulf from 1615 to 1635 affords us some interesting
:I3 of the penalties which follow the loss of the command
examples of the influence of sea-power on history, and
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in' of the sea, either in whole or in part. Thanks to their
complete control of the sea routes in the Gulf, the
ii i Portuguese held undisputed sway over all maritime
commerce in that region, down to the appearance of
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the English in force. That this fact was appreciated
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at Lisbon and at Madrid, is clear from the decision to
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send a powerful squadron of galleons, under such a
• • picked commander as Ruy Freyre, for the express
purpose of nipping the growing English commerce in
the bud in 1019. Shilling’s victory off Jask in the
following year was an important check to the
I practice. In a letter written shortly after hi* defeat at Jask, he wrote
Portuguese, but it did not have the decisive results it.
might have had, owing to the failure of the English to
follow up their success by completely destroying Ruy
•'! Freyre’s shattered .hulks. The result was that the
' (Letter of Ruy Freyre, Ormuz, ia/ii/1621. British Museum^ Egerton MSS.)
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Portuguese were still as great a menace as ever, and
with Ruy Freyre’s fleet still in being, they were
soon in a position to challenge the English for the
supremacy once more. This fact was realised by the
experienced old Governor, Fernao. de Albuquerque,
who, despite the almost total lack of resources against
which he had to struggle at Goa, spared no pains to
despatch powerful reinforcements to Ruy Freyre, at
the same time urging upon him the necessity of giving
battle again to the English fleet.
Ruy Freyre’s inability or unwillingness to recognise
the soundness of this advice, was the real reason of the
fall of Ormuz; for his voluntary abandonment of the
played into the hands of the English and Persians, as
the authorities at Goa had foreseen.1 There was
direct to Ormuz, instead of their usual half-way house
at Jask, and, after uniting with the Persians, shutting
the door of the trap in which Ruy Freyre had placed
himself. This once accomplished, the fall of Ormuz
was merely a matter of time; for however obstinate
the defence, the Castle was bound to fall if not
succoured from the sea—and this was rendered
impossible by the immolation and destruction of Ruy
Freyre’s galleons under the Castle walls, since there
was no other naval force in Portuguese India capable
of giving battle to the English vessels. Too late Ruy
r xCompare Fem2o d* Albuquerque’s letter* to Ruy Freyre quoted in note
1 on page 73 supra. In justice to Ruy Freyre it *hould be said that he
apparently realised the importance of maintaining an adequate armada to
cope with the English, even if he did not put his conviction* fully into
“ Realms which are situated on the shore* of the sea, and which have therein
SI «uch far-flung fortresses as His Majesty has in this, cannot be preserved
without well-eauipped fleets; and if His Majesty does not provide the same.
India will be lost, at likewise it* strongholds, and this one first of all.’’
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