Page 42 - Anglo Portuguese Rivalry in The Gulf_Neat

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I Freyre saw his error, and although, on his escape from to give battle to his enemies under all and every
captivity, he was anxious to make a last desperate'
conditions, caused the English no little worry and
attempt to retrieve the situation, by surprising the annoyance, but there was no corresponding lasting
victorious Anglo-Persian forces in the middle of their
advantage for the Portuguese. The appearance of
plundering orgies, the irresolution of his companion,
the Hollanders on the scene in 1623, introduced yet
I Constantino de Sa, lost him this last chance. It was another complication from the Lusitanian point of
|i i a slender one at best, for even assuming the bold stroke view
I had succeeded (which was after all quite possible), the , since the two heretic nations made common
4I fortress could never have been made tenable for long cause together. The indomitable behaviour of Ruy
;i! against a renewed Anglo-Persian attack, since Ruy Freyre and Botelho, did indeed hearten their men to
such an extent that the Portuguese regained much of
i Freyre had no galleons wherewith to oppose the English
the prestige they had lost; whilst the English and
1 • ships, which were the decisive factor in the situation, Dutch were forced to navigate together for mutual
as they assured the passage of the Persian troops from
■ 1 the mainland. protection, often with unduly large and costly fleets.
■'ii The annual cruise to the Comoro islands by the
It must be admitted that Ruy Freyre, if he was English, in order to protect their outward-bound
mainly to blame for the fall of Ormuz, owing to his
shipping from being waylaid by the Portuguese galleons,
neglect to dispute the command of the sea with the
was also an expensive waste of time, but the Portuguese
I English in 1621-1622, subsequently made amends as could never establish a decided superiority over the
8 i far as it lay within his power to do so. Although
allied forces, which were increasing yearly, whilst their
I I provided with only slender forces and indifferent
] own decreased as rapidly. Furthermore, even if
i! troops, he broke up the threatened Persian attack on Botelho and Ruy Freyre had succeeded in regaining
u * Muscat, reconquered much of the lost ground on the Ormuz, the place was by now little better than a heap
<5 • Arabian coast, and blockaded Ormuz so closely that
of ruins, its erstwhile trade having been diverted to
.iii it twice came within an ace of falling into his grasp. Muscat, Basra and Gombrun ; whilst it is very unlikely
Both times however the Persians were relieved by the
that the Portuguese could have held it against the
opportune appearance of the English fleet, against
overwhelming forces the allies could have brought to
winch Ruy Freyre’s oared frigates were powerless,
bear against them.
except under certain exceptional conditions. The
Nevertheless, the advantage was not wholly on the
most he could achieve was the rather melancholy
!: satisfaction that even if the Portuguese could not side of English and Persians. The European ships
were only present at Gombrun for a month or two in
regain Ormuz, its possession proved but a barren and
1 the year, and for the rest of the season the whole
profitless acquisition for the Persians.
littoral on the Persian side lay exposed to the ravages
The appearance of Botelho’s armada in 1625,
of Ruy Freyre’s waspish flotillas, which had unchallenged
seemed to afford another hope of reversing the situation
control of the Gulf from Cape Ras Musandam to the
but this was not really so. It is true that the masterly
H Shatt el Arab. It was entirely owing to the presence
5 * way in which Botelho handled his squadron and sought of Portuguese galliots in the Euphrates, that the
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