Page 131 - Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabi & Uman (1800-1870)

500-ton Bahrayni warship pierced for ten guns, and decided to sell it “paying
any balance that may be due to the banians out of the proceeds and dividing the
remainder of the proceeds among the crew that took the bugla”.1097
However, it was not only the affair with the Indian traders which worried
Pelly and led him to seize the ship. He had also suspected Muhammad of
intending to strengthen his relations with the Su‘udls, and therefore wanted to
clip his wings before he could ally himself with the Su‘udi amir.1098 The seizure
of the ship was thus intended to reduce Muhammad’s naval power and weaken
the chances for a possible Su‘udl alliance.
At that time, al-Bahrayn was nominally independent, but its ruler paid an
annual zakah of $MT 4,000 to al-Riyad nonetheless.1099 However, relations
between al-Bahrayn and al-Riyad began to get worse. When Faysal died and
‘Abd Allah came to power, the ruler of al-Bahrayn stopped paying the
zakah.1100 Amir ‘Abd Allah, deterred by his agreement with the British and by
his apprehension of the latter’s involvement in the affairs of al-Bahrayn, made
no attempt to force the payment of zakah."0' Although ‘Abd Allah sent a few
threats, the ruler of al-Bahrayn ignored them. 1102
In the following year, 1867, Muhammad b. Khalifah was confronted by an
uprising in his dependency of Qatar. Along with the provisions of the
Perpetual Treaty of Peace which Muhammad had signed five years earlier, this
incident was to have far-reaching consequences on the future of al-Bahrayn in
general, and on Muhammad’s rule in particular. Governed by a member of the
Al Khalifah family representing the ruler of al-Bahrayn, Qatar had been one of
al-Bahrayn’s dominions for many years. However, as time progressed, the
Qatari chiefs grew to resent Bahrayni authority, and gradually began to display
their discontent with certain administrative measures. This led to a
confrontation with their overlords, and contributed to the eventual break with
al-Bahrayn and the emergence of Qatar as an independent political state.
There are several factors which seem to have fostered Qatari dissatisfaction
with Muhammad b. Khalifah, whom they had helped considerably in his
original accession to power. Muhammad entrusted the administration of Qatar
to a member of his own family, but thereafter paid little attention to that part of
his territory, indicating a lack of consideration for its people and their previous
service to him.1103 The Qataris also discerned weakness in the present regime
on account of Muhammad’s inconsistent allegiances and his occasional
difficulties with both the British and the Su‘udls. Moreover, the Qataris’
previous affiliation with the Su‘udi state and their present connection with
Amir ‘Abd Allah b. Faysal provided them with the hope that, when the time
was ripe, they would be able to exploit these connections by seeking Su‘udl aid
in overthrowing the supremacy of al-Bahrayn.
Accordingly, in 1867, the Qataris made the first move toward a greater share
of home rule, marking the beginning of the end of Bahrayn’s authority over
Qatar. Ostensibly protesting at the seizure of ‘All b. Thamir, chief of the
Nu‘aym tribe, and his subsequent deportation and imprisonment in al-
Bahrayn by the governor of Qatar, Ahmad Al Khalifah, the inhabitants of
al-Wakrah and al-Dawhah attempted to drive out the governor and obtain the
prisoner’s release.
Irritated by the challenging behaviour of the Qatari independents, the ruler
of al-Bahrayn embarked upon a covert plan to punish them. He invited Qasim,
the prominent son of Muhammad b. ThanI, the most distinguished chief in

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