Page 58 - Arabiab Studies (IV)
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                 48                                        Arabian Studies IV
                 eastern waters. The use of the convenient term ‘piracy’ in this essay
                  is not meant to imply such a distinction. As will be seen below, the
                  Qawasim regarded their own attacks on commercial vessels as a
                  legitimate form of warfare and source of income.
                    An attempt to explain QasimI maritime activity should begin
                  with a brief description of the geography and commerce of the
                  Arabian shore, and especially of al-$Ir. it was natural for the tribes
                  of the Arab littoral to depend on the sea for a livelihood. With the
                  exceptions of Batirayn and the date-producing oases of al-tfasa
                  and al-Batfnah, the land was inhospitable. The coastal towns
                  subsisted on the pearling and fishing industries, and participated in
                  the carrying trade. In the 16th century, the Portuguese had
                  permanently diverted much Gulf commerce around the Cape of
                  Good Hope. Muscat, which commanded the Gulf entrance,
                   managed to maintain its relative dominance over local trade along
                   the Arab littoral.
                     The area of al-$Ir was less fortunate. Lacking oases and good
                   harbours, and sharing in only a small part of the pearl industry, it
                   would appear to have been predisposed to piracy. European
                   travellers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries provide
                   conflicting information as to the viability of legitimate trade in the
                   area. We do know that the Qawasim maintained tribal ties with the
                   Arab population of ports on the Persian coast, and were for a long
                   time successful in asserting their political claims over Lingah, a
                   port which shared in the trade between India and Persia. The
                   merchants of al-$Ir may thus have had access, at Lingah, to the
                   major flow of commercial traffic in the Gulf. With this evidence, it
                   does not seem valid to argue simply that poverty alone drove the
                   Qawasim to prey on passing merchant ships.
                      A more complete explanation rests with the nearly continuous
                    maritime warfare in which the Qawasim engaged. The primary
                    enemy was the dynasty of A1 Bu Said, which came to power over a
                    portion of Oman in the 1740s when Ahmad b. Said A1 Bu Said
                    was elected to the Iba<jl imamate at Rustaq. From the beginning,
                    A1 Bu Said laid claim to al-$Ir, which was largely Sunni and which
                    recently had come under the domination of the Qawasim
                    confederacy. In his contemporary account of the struggle, the
                    Omani historian Ibn Ruzayq makes little, if any distinction
                    between acts of piracy and acts of war perpetrated by both sides.5
                    The Qawasim were intent on securing their independence and on
                    having access to ports on the Gulf of Oman such as Khawr
                    Fakkan and Suljar. Piracy was a sanctioned method of fighting
                    which provided the Qawasim with booty to be divided among the
                    men, with portions going to the Shaykh of their major town, Ras


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