Page 62 - Arabiab Studies (IV)

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52 Arabian Studies IV

regarded as evidence of bad faith. Not surprisingly, these
preliminary articles were shelved.
Over the next few years, officials at Bombay advocated, albeit
vaguely, the encouragement of QasimI trade with India. In this
regard, Hasan b. Ghayth’s plea may have had some influence. The
major point of his argument—the implied desire of Ras al-
Khaymah to be dealt with separately from Dir‘iyyah—did not
make much of an impression. The beginning and extent of
Wahhabi control over QasimI maritime activity is not clear. With
benefit of hindsight, it appears that Dir‘iyyah’s control was such
that it could install co-operative QasimI shaykhs as governors,
demand tribute, and elicit at least temporary and outward signs of
conversion to the Unitarian doctrine. Though not initiated by the
Wahhabis, QasimI piracy proliferated under their wing. The
earliest QasimI attacks on Company shipping preceded the
imposition of Wahhabi authority in al-$Ir, but it was under Hasan
b. Rabmah that such activity reached its peak. Wahhabi control
became the official British explanation of QasimI piracy; maritime
warfare was, for a long time, considered a separate issue.
For nearly two decades, Bombay lacked sufficient funds, ships,
and manpower to defeat the Qawasim decisively. More impor­
tantly, the British were deterred from military activity in Eastern
Arabia by the presence of the Wahhabis, with whom warfare could
have been protracted and futile. In 1819, Bombay was in a position
to make a concerted effort; the conclusion of wars in India by
1818, and the defeat of the Sa‘udls by the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha
in the same year, made this possible. At the end of October 1819,
an expedition embarked from Bombay under the command of
Major-General William Grant Keir, and won a decisive victory
over the Qawasim in early December.
The consequences of a limited understanding of both QasimI
piracy and the internal politics of the area were evident in the
proposed British settlement. A more accurate perception was
evident in Keir’s actions, in his response to his orders, and in the
General Treaty of Peace for which he was responsible.12 Keir was
in communication with the British agents at Bushahr and Tehran,
and met personally with Sa*Id b. Sultan of Muscat and with the
QasimI shaykhs. He therefore had more complete and up-to-date
information than did his superiors in India.
Keir had, for example, been ordered to destroy ‘the piratical
vessels and craft of every description’; he interpreted this in such a
way as to spare those boats thought to be outfitted for fishing and
pearling.13 Hasan b. Rahmah had been detained after the defeat of
Ras al-Khaymah. His followers considered this a violation of the