Page 65 - Arabiab Studies (IV)

QasimI Piracy and General Treaty of Peace 55
into consideration that now, in defeat, the Qawasim had lost many
of their commercial and political ties with the Persian port towns;
only the alliance with Lingah seemed to have survived the 1819
expedition.19
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Qawasim continued to
engage in maritime warfare and piracy. Deflected by the British
from their traditional Muscati enemies and Indian merchants, the
Qawasim were drawn into conflicts with the Ban! Yas of Abu
Dhabi and Dubai, despite the General Treaty of Peace. This had
much to do with the internal difficulties of the BanI Yas, and with
the disintegration of relations among QasimI ports.20 The fact that
many incidents occurred on the pearl banks during the diving
season21 indicates also economic competition. These disturbances
threatened the general security of the Gulf, and the British
frequently intervened to demand compensation from the offending
ports.22 Although East India Company ships were rarely attacked,
the suppression of this new piracy was a primary task assigned the
British officer who took the new post of Resident in the Gulf
beginning in 1822.
Nevertheless, viewed against the events of the preceding twenty
years, the largely impractical Treaty of 1820 is important because it
marked a change in British policy. Potentially, at least, it tied the
economy—rather than the politics—of al-$Ir to Bombay’s interests
in a peaceful Gulf. This approach was amplified and refined in the
course of the 19th century, resulting in the Maritime Truces
(1835-52) and the Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity (1853).23 The
annual Truces were successful in curbing conflicts between the
Qawasim and the BanI Yas during the pearling season, and helped
therefore to protect an important source of local income. Like the
General Treaty of 1820, the Truces were based on a principle of
mutual economic benefit, and did not place heavy obligations on
the British. The same can be said of the perpetual peace treaty, by
which the signatories agreed to cease all hostilities at sea. Sporadic
instances of such hostilities and piracy did in fact continue
throughout the 19th century, but through the treaty mechanism,
the British could effectively mediate along the Arab littoral and
frustrate the interests of outside powers.
The 1820 peace settlement served as a precedent for an
ultimately successful and efficient exercise of control. This was
largely because Keir made use of his first-hand experience and
knowledge, and because he understood that piracy was an integral
part of traditional QasimI warfare and economy.