Page 64 - Arabiab Studies (IV)

54 Arabian Studies IV
inadequate, Keir replied that any regulations would prove
impractical and that harsh measures—such as prohibiting the
import of shipbuilding timber—would restrict legitimate trade as
well as piracy. Keir did not show much interest in defending the
specific articles of the Treaty, but offered a defence in general
terms. The mild concessions had been agreed to ‘without our
having had occasion to excite by violence many feelings that would
have interfered greatly with the views for the permanent
suppression of Piracy’.16 Keir was interested in ‘associating on one
pacific principle the whole of the Arab tribes generally considered
predatory’.17 No single QasimI shaykh or port could depend on
peaceful trade and risk attack by other Qawasim. Keir believed
that the presence of a small British naval station in the Gulf would
afford the security necessary for a multilateral change to take
place.
2. Up to the time of the expedition, the British Governor at
Bombay had been keen on assigning al-$Ir—once it had been
defeated—to Sa‘Id b. Sultan of Muscat. Sa‘Id’s increasingly
ambitious policies, however, made him now a less attractive ally,
and finally Bombay empowered Keir to install at Ras al-Khaymah
any shaykh of his own choosing who would co-operate in the
suppression of piracy. Keir declined to do this, and instead allowed
the internal politics of al-$Ir to sort itself out. He realized that
supporting a candidate of his own choice would not be much easier
than supporting Sa‘Id. Either case would prove an expensive
obligation for the Company. Any political manipulations imposed
by the British would likely lead to hostilities among A1 Bu Sa‘Td, A1
Khallfah of Baforayn, the Qawasim, and even the Qajars of Persia,
whose interests in the Gulf Bombay tended to ignore. Keir believed
that such maritime warfare would be the breeding ground of
piracy, and that the British would in this way be defeating their
own purpose.18
It is to Keir’s credit that he was able to persuade Bombay to
accept his Treaty and settlement as they stood. It might also be
said that his lenient treatment of the defeated Qawasim facilitated
subsequent negotiations. As far as it went, his assessment of the
situation was correct, but his solution was not in itself adequate.
The Qawasim could not simply revive the trade they were
supposed to have enjoyed before Wahhabi and British interference.
Bombay maintained that the ports of India should be open to the
Qawasim in order to stimulate their commerce; yet no evidence
suggests that attention was given to what the Qawasim might
export or transport for others, in view of the fact that Muscat still
dominated the carrying trade on the Arab littoral. Nor was it taken
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