Page 59 - Arabiab Studies (IV)
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QasimI Piracy and General Treaty of Peace               49
       al-Khaymah, and later also to the Amir at Dir’iyyah. Piratical
       warfare, therefore, perpetuated itself, but also advanced the
       political and territorial aims of the Qawasim.
         At the turn of the 19th century, naturally, the East India
       Company had a different perspective. To the Bombay Government
       had fallen the responsibility of maintaining the Gulf as one of the
       routes to India. The Cape of Good Hope and the Red Sea
       dominated the imperial scheme, but the Gulf was part of the mail
       route between Western India and Europe. Also, Indian merchants
       called upon Bombay to take responsibility for the security of their
       ships, which often sailed under British colours. Bonaparte’s
       invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the Franco-Russian Treaty of Tilsit
       in 1807, followed by intrigues in Persia, appeared to threaten
       England’s position in the Middle East. Bombay, therefore, had
       always to be wary of outside influence in the Gulf.
         The spread of Wahhabi power stimulated Bombay’s interest in
       Muscat. Pressured by the Wahhabis on his borders, and by
       religious and tribal divisions within Oman, the Ruler of Muscat6 at
       first looked to both the French and the English for support. As
       British Supremacy became apparent, he turned more and more to
       Bombay. For its part, Bombay saw in a friendship with Muscat an
       opportunity both to increase Company trade in the Gulf, and to
       have a political ally in the area. The British, therefore, disapproved
       of QasimI attacks on Muscati ships.
         It was with these preoccupations and with only limited resources
       that the Bombay Government confronted the specific problem of
       QasimI attacks on Company shipping, the first of which occurred
       in 1797. In 1806, the British concluded a vague peace agreement
       with a QasimI shaykh. After three years they sent a small punitive
       expedition against al-$Ir, and later a few British ships attempted to
       police the Gulf. None of these measures had sufficient or lasting
       effect.
         The incidents of a single year may serve as an example. In 1808,
       at least twenty native Indian vessels fell victim to the Qawasim. In
       the same year four ships of the East India Company were attacked.
       The incident which drew most attention was the capture of the
       Minerva, a merchant ship owned by the Company’s Resident at
       Ba$ra, Samuel Manesty. The Minerva was chased by a large
       squadron of QasimI boats, encircled, and boarded. Nearly all the
       crew members were ceremoniously put to death.7 The religious
       overtones of the executions in this and other instances encouraged
       the British to believe that, once the Wahhabis had imposed
       themselves in al-$Ir (possibly in 1803 and definitely by 1807®), the
       Qawasim had accepted their doctrine with zeal and had been
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