Page 110 - Arabian Studies (II)
P. 110
100 Arabian Studies II
The following month ibn Sa‘ud did, however, reply to the
Company: ‘After careful study it became clear to His Majesty that
the safest way for the reservation of the rights of your Company and
those of the IdrlsI country as well would be to revise the terms of
the concession and to base them on a solid foundation which would
guarantee the existence of good relations between you and the
Government in future in a form that would not allow objection or
cause disturbance.’128 The High Commissioner in Cairo advised the
Company to send a representative to Jeddah to draw up a new
agreement under ibn Sa‘ud’s supervision. 1 2 9
The Company was averse to drawing up a new agreement with the
xdris! and in view of Sayyid Hasan’s determination to end the
agreement it was decided to terminate the concession.
A final incident in August was decisive: on the 4th the Company
of ZIfaf received a wireless message to shift from ZIfaf to Harghada.
Upon hearing this news Sayyid Hasan sent Sayyid Yahya RTfai to
ZIfaf to prevent any such transfer.130 Official British intervention
on behalf of the Company had become impossible following the
Company’s recognition of Ibn Sa‘ud as arbitrator.131 By this time it
had concluded that to make a test at Ras Hassls would have involved
an expenditure of £50,000. Moreover, the Company would have to
negotiate a new agreement with Sayyid Hasan under Ibn Sa‘ud’s
supervision which would have involved additional expenditure. It
decided, therefore, that if the British Government could not secure
for it the rights granted them under the then existing agreement with
the IdrlsI, it would withdraw from Farasan.13 2
On 21 August 1928 the Commanding Officer of the Red Sea
Sloops cabled the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to the effect
that the High Commissioner in Egypt had suggested that sloops
should visit Farasan where the Company’s evacuation of the island
was being impeded by the IdrlsI since the protection fee of £3000
had not been paid. 1 3 3 The evacuation got underway on the 6th
I c . , .
ep em er but the IdrlsI forbade the removal of the Company’s
equipment, although Sayyid Hasan’s agent guaranteed to avoid
violence. However, when H.M.S. Dahlia, one of the Red Sea Sloops,
mve oif Farasan the Idrlsi’s representative voluntarily raised the
em argo on loading the equipment, and the evacuation was
completed by mid-September. British relations with the IdrlsI
steadily deteriorated thereafter and on 1 September 1930 H.M.S.
Uemalis was not permitted to call at Farasan. 1 3 4
Finally in connection with Farasan, mention must be made of
enry de Monfreid. Just before the First World War he contemplated
a empting to exploit the oil believed to exist there. Subsequently he
I