Page 111 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat
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Saudi Arabia and Iran: Outside Pressures     «7

           Besides using the inland tribes as leverage against the rulers
         of the Coast, I bn Jaluvvi made his presence felt there in other
         ways. In February 1926, for example, showing no respect whatever
         for the sovereignty of Shaykh Sultan bin Saejr, lie sent a police
         force to Sharjah in pursuit of an escaped criminal from Ncjd. He
         demanded the extradition of the criminal, although, of course,   no
         extradition treaty with Sharjah existed. When the hunted   man was not
         found, the police force continued the search in Ajman and Ras
         al-Khaimah.fiA The same year, Ibn Jaluwi censured the qadi of
         Sharjah and Shaykh Sa‘id of Dubai for not having satisfied Ncjdi
         complainants in judicial cases. It was not accidental that, with the
         exception of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, all the men who performed the
         duties of qadi on the Coast had strong Ncjdi connections. Wahhabi
         influence in these places was so strong that the Political Resident
         reported with alarm a rumour that Shaykh Sultan of Sharjah had
         sent his qadi to Hasa and Mecca to ask for a Wahhabi Resident
         at Sharjah.56
           Although Abu Dhabi was vehemently anti-Wahhabi, its rulers
         recognised the importance of courting the favour of their powerful
         neighbour. When Shaykh Hamdan came to power in 1912, he
         sent a mission to Ibn Sa‘ud to announce his succession. Ten years
         later, Shaykh Sultan sent his son Hazza*, bearing gifts, to Riyadh,
         to do the same thing.57 When Sultan was in turn murdered by
         his brother, his sons appealed to Ibn Jaluwi for protection against
         their uncle and for permission to live in Dalma island. Their
         uncle, Saqr, ruled for about a year, and during his tenure courted
         Ibn Jaluwi by sending presents and by helping zokat collectors
         in their task, in the hope that the governor of Hasa would strengthen
         his (Saqr’s) position against the recalcitrant members of his family.
         Ibn Jaluwi, however, did not force his authority. In 1930 the
         Bani Yas complained to Shaykh Shakhbut about the zokat collectors;
         Shakhbut complained to Ibn Jaluwi, who withdrew the collectors
         without further ado.58 The ruler of Dubai was also vehemently
         anti-Wahhabi, but was not as deferential as the rulers of Abu
         Dhabi; he did not hesitate, however, to rid Dubai of any elements
         that were anti-Wahhabi, as he was always nervous of retaliation.
           The remaining shaykhdoms maintained a more friendly rapport
         with the Wahhabis, and in 1927 the Political Resident claimed
         that they were all in private communication with Ibn Sa‘ud.59
         They knew the effect this had on the British authorities, and often
         used a call to Ibn Sa‘ud as a weapon against British pressure.
         In 1930, for example, when Shaykh Sultan of Ras al-Khaimah
         was being pressured into acc epting a Royal Air Force fuel barge,
         he desperately warned the Residency Agent that, if the pressure
         persisted, he would place himself under the protection of Ibn Sa‘ud.
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