Page 109 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat
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Saudi Arabia and Iran: Outside Pressures     «5

        protect themselves from their more powerful neighbouring, tribes
        rather than because they were afraid ol a Wahhabi invasion, as
        in the nineteenth century. The methods of I bn Sa‘ud and I bn
       Jaluwi were radically different from those of their forebears:
          Today it is the power of letting loose a strong tribe to raid
          a weaker Dhahirah one and carry off its camels without hope
          of redress or retaliation that is Ibn Saud’s strength. Thus immedi­
          ately before the arrival of Ibn Saud’s zakat collector, one of
          the Bani Yas tribes was raided by the al-Murra and lost a
          hundred and fifty camels. Payment of zakat to Ibn Saud is
          therefore a kind of insurance against the raider. It is the wisdom
          and economy of the present Abdul Aziz to bring his insiduous
          pressure to bear on a wavering tribe through a strong and loyal
          neighbour whose interest it is to be ensured the fruits of victory.
          ... In reality it is not Ibn Saud himself whom they desire
          to propitiate, but his viceroy, Ibn Jaluwi. . . .44
        The dispatch of the zakat collector had immediate repercussions.
        The forces of the Ibadi imam of Oman, led by ‘Isa bin Salih,
        began to mobilise for a march on Dahirat al-Sir, the southern
        half of the Dahirah plain, which lies between the mountains of
        northern Oman and the desert in the west, in order to resist
        any form of Wahhabi aggression in Oman. The Hinawi elements
        in the Trucial Coast rallied around ‘Isa bin Salih and quietly
        declared their support for him. Late in July 1925, Shaykh Sa‘id
        bin Maktum of Dubai secretly sent his cousins Sa‘id bin Butti
        and Suhayl bin Butti to ‘Isa, to assure him of his backing and
        that of Sultan bin Zayid of Abu Dhabi in the event of Wahhabi
        encroachment. Rumours of an invasion had been strengthened by
        a statement, attributed to Su‘ayyid, that Ibn Sa‘ud intended to
        send an army to Buraimi,45 and wild stories were circulating that
        the fort at Buraimi village, originally built by the Wahhabis in
        the nineteenth century, was being restored for use by Ibn Sa‘ud.46
        Other supporters included the chiefs of the Na‘im, Bani Ka‘b and
        Bani Qitab tribes, who negotiated with Shaykh Sultan bin Saqr
        of Sharjah for mutual assistance in case of Wahhabi encroachments;
        and the ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain.
          Sa‘id bin Maktum denied that his cousins had gone to Oman
        to sec ‘Isa bin Salih,47 as for obvious reasons he was  anxious
        to hide the facts of his new alliance from the Wahhabis. The
        details were disclosed in the Cairo newspaper Al-Shura48 on 29
        October 1925 in an item contributed by Shaykh Sulayman al-Baruni
        al-Nafusi,49 which claimed that Sa‘id’s cousins had carried to ‘Isa
        bin Salih a letter, signed by the rulers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi,
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