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Saudi Arabia and Iran: Outside Pressures 8i
Sultan hoisted his Hag on Tunb, and the ruler of Sharjah made
no protest. The Persian claim was revived in 1923, when the Iranian
Foreign Ministry sent the British Minister in Tehran a note reasserting
Iranian rights to Abu Musa and Tunb.22 This followed a rumour
in Tehran that the Iranian Government had been pressured by
an Iranian red-oxide concessionaire to press claims at the League
of Nations for Bahrain and Abu Musa.23 Abu Musa had a large
deposit of red oxide, and in I925 the Iranian customs authorities
inspected the island and removed a bag of the oxide. Following
warnings from the British Minister, the Iranian Government ordered
its customs officials not to interfere in Abu Musa until the status
of the island had been determined.24
In order to strengthen its position in the Gulf, the Iranian Govern
ment needed to organise the building of a navy. Overtures for
help were made to the British Government, but finally it was
from Italy that gunboats and patrol vessels, serviced by Italian
officers, were purchased. The navy provided Iran with an instrument
to challenge British authority in Gulf waters, and this was manifested
largely by the seizure of Arab dhows in an attempt to control
the smuggling carried on by the Arabs to the southern coast of
Iran. During the 1920s and 1930s there was a spate of such incidents,
following the Iranian Government’s imposition, in 1925, of a tax
on all consignments of tea and sugar imported into Iran.25 A
thriving contraband traffic in these commodities was carried on
from the Arab coast, principally from Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai,
and the Iranian Government found it difficult to control. An official
appeal to the British Minister in Tehran for aid in quelling the
traffic was refused, and the Government of India made it clear
that ‘it is not our business to control harmless exports like sugar
from our Arab Protectorates, and Persia’s apparent expectation to
the contrary . . . has, as far as we know, no basis in international
usage . * 26 The Iranian Government, therefore, took the matter into
its own hands, and, with the purchase in 1931 of patrol vessels i
from Italy, was able to stop and search Arab dhows in Gulf waters.
THE BACK DOOR: WAHHABI INFLUENCE IN
*925
In 1930, Biscoe, the Political Resident, accurately defined the inade
quacies of the British position on the Coast in the face of the
power of I bn Sa ud: We hold the front door to these principalities
on the littoral, but we do not hold the back door.’27 It was precisely
through this back door that Ibn Sa‘ud was able to increase his
influence on the Coast, for it was in the inland
areas that the