Page 105 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat
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Saudi Arabia and Iran: Outside Pressures     8i
         Sultan hoisted his Hag on Tunb, and the ruler of Sharjah made
         no protest. The Persian claim was revived in 1923, when the Iranian
         Foreign Ministry sent the British Minister in Tehran a note reasserting
         Iranian rights to Abu Musa and Tunb.22 This followed a rumour
         in Tehran that the Iranian Government had been pressured by
         an Iranian red-oxide concessionaire to press claims at the League
         of Nations for Bahrain and Abu Musa.23 Abu Musa had a large
         deposit of red oxide, and in I925 the Iranian customs authorities
         inspected the island and removed a bag of the oxide. Following
         warnings from the British Minister, the Iranian Government ordered
         its customs officials not to interfere in Abu Musa until the status
         of the island had been determined.24
           In order to strengthen its position in the Gulf, the Iranian Govern­
         ment needed to organise the building of a navy. Overtures for
         help were made to the British Government, but finally it was
         from Italy that gunboats and patrol vessels, serviced by Italian
         officers, were purchased. The navy provided Iran with an instrument
         to challenge British authority in Gulf waters, and this was manifested
         largely by the seizure of Arab dhows in an attempt to control
         the smuggling carried on by the Arabs to the southern coast of
         Iran. During the 1920s and 1930s there was a spate of such incidents,
         following the Iranian Government’s imposition, in 1925, of a tax
         on all consignments of tea and sugar imported into Iran.25 A
         thriving contraband traffic in these commodities was carried on
         from the Arab coast, principally from Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai,
         and the Iranian Government found it difficult to control. An official
         appeal to the British Minister in Tehran for aid in quelling the
         traffic was refused, and the Government of India made it clear
         that ‘it is not our business to control harmless exports like sugar
         from our Arab Protectorates, and Persia’s apparent expectation to
         the contrary . . . has, as far as we know, no basis in international
         usage . * 26  The Iranian Government, therefore, took the matter into
         its own hands, and, with the purchase in 1931 of patrol vessels        i
         from Italy, was able to stop and search Arab dhows in Gulf waters.




         THE BACK DOOR: WAHHABI INFLUENCE IN
                                                        *925
         In 1930, Biscoe, the Political Resident, accurately defined the inade­
         quacies of the British position on the Coast in the face of the
         power of I bn Sa ud: We hold the front door to these principalities
         on the littoral, but we do not hold the back door.’27 It was precisely
         through this back door that Ibn Sa‘ud was able to increase his
         influence on the Coast, for it was in the inland
                                                         areas that the
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