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78 The Origins of the United Arab Emirates

afraid that his people would join ranks with them in order to
endanger his own position, and asked the Resident if he would
help him if he were attacked or if an uprising occurred. Colonel
Trevor, the Resident, made it very clear that the 1916 treaty
bound Britain to protect the shaykh from attack by sea only,
and that, if hostilities between him and Ibn Sa'ud did occur,
the only form of help lie could rely on would be in the diplomatic
sphere. This answer was in keeping with the British policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of the shaykhdoms, but did
not lake into account the difficulties facing the ruler of Qatar.
The disaffected members of his family, led by his older brother
Shaykh Khali fall, were in constant communication with Ibn Sa‘ud,
who gave them moral, as well as financial, support. Sure of Wahhabi
backing, they openly defied ‘Abdallah; the result was a state of
growing lawlessness in Qatar and a great decline in the ruler’s
authority. The only source of power to which ‘Abdallah could
turn would assure him of nothing but diplomatic assistance. This
left him almost entirely to his own devices to combat the subtle
attacks of the Wahhabis. He realised that Ibn Sa‘ud would not
risk an open attack on Qatar, but he also knew that the king
could make his role as shaykh of Qatar so impossible that sooner
or later he would have to place himself under the protection of
the Wahhabis.13
It was not until the latter part of 1922 that any official British
statement was made regarding Wahhabi encroachments on Qatar.
During the conference at ‘Uqayr, a conversation took place between
Cox, Ibn Sa‘ud and Frank Holmes regarding an oil concession
in Hasa. Cox was startled when he realised that Ibn Sa‘ud considered
all of Qatar as part of Hasa, and sharply told the Wahhabi ruler
that Qatar was outside his jurisdiction. Although Ibn Sa‘ud did
not argue the point,14 he also did not accept it; and in the next
decade the issue of his boundaries with Qatar and with Abu Dhabi
was of major importance. Ibn Sa‘ud continued to seize every possible
opportunity to undermine the authority of Shaykh ‘Abdallah until
the latter finally realised that it was time for him to work out
a new policy. Since he could not rely on British protection, his
only hope was to come to an agreement with the king. In 1930
he admitted to the Political Agent in Bahrain that he paid the
Wahhabi ruler a secret subsidy of 1 lakh of rupees (i.e. 100,000)
a year.15 Thus, by employing subtle forms of pressure, Ibn Sa‘ud
was able to gain control of Qatar; he received a secret subsidy
from Shaykh ‘Abdallah, and his representatives in Hasa were strong
enough to control events in the shaykhdom without incurring British
wrath by open aggressiveness.
Whereas Saudi Arabia was a young country whose king well

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