Page 108 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

Gary Schaub Jr.: Without doubt, the resurgence and revanchist behavior of Russia.

After the Cold War, the Nordics found themselves far from the front line of global conflict.

After Ukraine, they suddenly found themselves once again on the front lines. Conflict was in their region and
security had to become a serious business again.

Figure 34 The first panel seen left to right at the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium: Dr. Gary Schaub, CMS,
Dr. Peter Jackobsen, Royal Danish Defence College, and Col. Anders Rex, Royal Danish Air Force. Credit
Photo: SLD

Question: We should be clear about the threat.

This is NOT the Soviet Union at the head of the Warsaw Pact; this is Russia shaping power to achieve
what it believes are its strategic NATIONAL interests.

How do you see the Russian dynamic?

Gary Schaub Jr.: With the Soviets, there was a direct threat of territorial invasion; the new Russian threat is
not about invasion, it is about intimidation to achieve their objectives in the region, notably with regard to the
Baltic states and the Arctic.

The Russians have shaped a significant missile and air bubble over the region which includes
surveillance, electronic warfare, and various other means to reach deep into the entire region.

The Russians are able to see fairly well with their own sensors what’s going on and can put Nordic air forces
at significant risk in their operations, which also include frequent direct encounters in the region’s airspaces.

This is a new reality for a new generation of young Nordic leaders growing up in this decade.

One should also realize that the Russians are using exercises like ZAPAD 17 to influence Western behavior.

They are triggering Cold War reminisces for military and political purposes.

It is not about the primacy of the Army and the ground forces; it is about generating our own anti-access
and area denial strategy to counter them from the Arctic to the Baltics.

We should be very wary of sinking money into ground forces, which are costly and not really directed at
deflecting the real Russian strategy.

Second Line of Defense

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