Page 111 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

In other words, a process of de-territorializing or multi-nationalizing defense of sovereign airspace is evolving
in Europe.

The Nordic states can be seen as both stimulating and being part of this trend.

The Dutch, the Norwegians, and the Danes all have very small air forces and there has been some talk on how
could they possibly share doing quick reaction alerts.

As all three will transition from flying F-16s to flying F-35s, this would seem to be a natural process of
evolution, to shape a regional quick reaction alert capability.

But the important thing would not necessarily be the resources saved by sharing the responsibility, although
that has been the context for most of the discussions.

Rather, the real significance would come from removing the bureaucratic and practical barriers that
remain to hinder operational cooperation between these air forces.

Question: The Danes are an F-35 partner, and the new defense agreement clearly is leveraging the F-35
as a key regional tool and a trigger for creating capability for what we are discussing as a counter to the
Russian A2/AD threat to the region.

How important is the F-35 to the Danes in shaping a regional approach?

Gary Schaub Jr.: The F-35 program as a global program is really the key point.

A common aircraft and common support structure are built into the program from the ground up. It is a central
dimension of the program and provides as-yet unrealized opportunities for cooperation, integration, and
force multiplying effects.

The key for the U.S. will be make sure that the technology inherent in the aircraft is shaped into an
operational program that makes this promise a reality.

Building a community of practice organically that’s tied to the program will lead to, I think, greater
operational cooperation.

There is an inherent opportunity not only to share logistics supply, but maintenance as well, which would
generate greater collaborative capabilities and generate much higher use rates.

For example, if the maintenance crews of one country are able to work on the aircraft of another country
through a common security clearance, this would obviously have a significant effect on the use of the F-35
fleets.

When I talk to allied air forces, it is clear that there are legal restrictions to doing that. But that is not a
problem of the aircraft; rather it is how nations are organized to operate even the SAME aircraft.

Hopefully over the next 10 years, as these countries receive all their aircraft and start using them in the field,
they’ll work their way towards overcoming those barriers to cooperation and this is clearly something the
Danish Air Force is very interested in seeing happen.

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