Page 109 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

Question: How best to deter the Russians in the period ahead?

Gary Schaub Jr.: Part of the effort is to shape the region’s own counter anti-access and area denial strategy
– pushing into the Russian zone covering the Baltic states and reaching out very deep into Nordic territory –
but also working the political and information issues as well.

The Baltic states have rather large Russian populations and two of the three Baltic states have conceived of
citizenship in terms of ethnicity and linguistics as opposed to where you were born.

This is a prescription for real opportunities for the Russians to meddle in the years ahead.

The Lithuanian solution of incorporating the Russians within their national identity should be considered long
and hard.

Latvia and Estonia need to think about the ways in which the institutions of the state can better integrate
Russians within their borders.

The information space is crucial as well.

The Russians are trying to work the media in the Nordic region but they simply are running dead center
against the Scandinavian culture of shaping consensus.

Societal resilience in the Nordic states makes them a tough sell for outreaches like Sputnik and RT. Therefore,
when the Russians attempt to influence the Danes through the media, they do it with the Russian ambassador
threatening to nuke Denmark if they participate in NATO BMD.

It should be noted that the new ambassador, when he was posted earlier this year, rescinded the threat made
by his predecessor because it clearly didn’t work.

IT infrastructure is a different challenge and clearly the Russians are putting pressure on such infrastructure in
the region.

Question: How has Nordic cooperation progressed during your time in Denmark?

Gary Schaub Jr.: It has progressed significantly.

Initially, much of the cooperation was very political and often symbolic.

It has become less headline grabbing and more focused on the nuts and bolts of cooperation to shape
real military capabilities as well as enhanced crisis management.

This is clearly a work in progress, but the change is significant.

NORDEFCO has been the organized effort to enhance cooperation among Denmark, Norway, Iceland,
Finland, and Sweden.

NORDEFCO is now focused on ways to enhance operational military capabilities among the forces. For
example, an agreement was reached last year on “Easy Access” among the air and naval forces of the
member states.

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